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EMPLOYMENT INEQUITIES, GENDER ROLES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY
KATHRYN BRANCH'
Gender inequities in employment are apparent in many different con-
texts and have numerous components. The most quantifiable measure is a
comparison between the relative earnings of men and women. A related
measure is the distribution by gender across occupational lines and the aver-
age relative salaries of jobs that tend to be predominantly occupied by work-
ers of one gender. All available statistics show that men earn significantly
more than women.' This remains true no matter what year the figures are
from, or whether they are weighted according to age, labor force status, or
educational attainment.2 If financial compensation for work is any indicator,
women are worth significantly less than men in the United States.
Women are not worth as much as men in the labor market because
notions of traditional gender roles continue to result in the prescriptive as-
signment of responsibility for children and home to women. Although it
may be true that more women than men would prefer to care for home and
family, even in the absence of cultural pressure, not all women desire such a
role. It is equally true that not all men would eschew primary caretaking
roles. In a fundamentally fair society, the talents and desires of each individ-
ual, instead of the biological accident of gender, will decide their appropriate
role. Although it is currently possible for an individual to rise above cultural
pressures and claim a role different from that encouraged for their gender,
the mere fact that a hurdle can be cleared does not justify its existence. The
strong influence of prescriptive gender roles is an unnecessary hurdle bar-
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ring individual choice and a major factor in gender inequities in em-
ployment.
This Note argues that the elimination of existing gender inequities in
employment will require, first, the establishment of institutional and structur-
al support for families such that concurrent commitments to family and
career are possible; second, the abandonment of prescriptive gender roles
and expectations; and, third, an appropriate increase in our cultural valua-
tion of nurturing work, particularly the work of childrearing. The result will
be that both men and women are equally able to choose whether to commit
primarily to career or family, or to pursue concurrent involvement. Section
One examines the manifestations and causes of gender inequities in em-
ployment in the United States. Section Two examines current public policy
with respect to gender inequities in employment and prescriptive gender
roles in the family, and offers a brief survey of the cumulative legislative
and judicial history with respect to gender inequities in employment. Section
Three identifies areas that have not been addressed effectively on a public
policy level and suggests that a reformulation of gender ideology is neces-
sary to address gender inequities in employment. The argument is that a
causal relationship exists between first, the persistence of gender inequities
in employment; second, the persistence of the cultural assumption that it is
primarily the woman's responsibility to care for the household and children;
third, the cultural devaluation of that work, and fourth; the consequential
devaluation of the women themselves who are performing that devalued
work or other work. As long as women continue to take primary responsi-
bility for family and home without cultural and institutional support, gender
equity in employment cannot be achieved. A woman who has to divide her
attention between family and career cannot compete effectively in the mar-
ketplace with men who are able to choose-without risk of social stigma-to
devote the majority of their attention to their career.
Overt gender discrimination in the workplace has been adequately ad-
dressed by federal policy.' There still remains, however, the problem that
comparable worth proposals attempt to address: namely, that women are
"stuck" in lower paying, gender-segregated jobs with few opportunities for
upward mobility. An effective, feasible solution, however, must go beyond
job evaluations and comparable worth to address the outdated notion that it
is a woman's responsibility to rear her children without the benefit of insti-
tutional support, and that the work of caring for children is not valuable to
our society. Public policy must address childcare and parental leave as social
issues-not women's problems. A wide range of options should be made
available to all families, whether one or both parents choose to work outside
the home. We must create a system in which parental and career commit-
ments are neither mutually exclusive nor gender-driven. The first step in
creating such a system must be a shift in public opinion and governmental
policy from viewing the responsibility for childrearing as the private folly of
3. I do not contend that gender discrimination in employment is no longer a problem, I
merely assert that the proper legislative tools to combat discrimination-as it is currently
defined-have been developed. See infra Section Two.
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individual family units, to a recognition of the stake society as a whole has
in raising generations of well cared-for children.
I. WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT: IDENTIFYING INEQUITIES AND THEIR SOURCES
Throughout history, women in western culture have been considered
the inferior sex. Ubiquitous cultural ideals have sharply delineated appropri-
ate gender roles and separate spheres of ambition for men and wom-
en-while men have both controlled and enjoyed access to the opportunities
of the world at large, the acceptable realm of experience for women has
traditionally been confined to the home.4 While money and power have
traditionally defined success, society has seen fit to "protect" women from all
means of acquiring them other than attachment to a man, be he father or
husband. Although most laws allowing explicit gender discrimination have
been repealed, women in the United States still encounter the legacy of these
laws in the form of cultural norms and pressures, and in the reality of gen-
der inequities in employment.
Labor force participation rates for women, including wives and mothers,
rose dramatically in the mid-twentieth century,' as women began to defy
traditional ideals. Women's income, however, remained pitifully small in
comparison to that earned by their husbands, fathers, and sons.6 And as
women increasingly joined the paid workforce7 for reasons other than pure
financial need, society responsed with less than wholehearted support. Wom-
4. This is not to say that women in the labor market is a new phenomenon, rather that
the culturally acceptable or ideal place for women has been in the home. Women with finan-
cial need have always worked outside the home. For men of all classes, however, financial
need has been an irrelevant factor in the decision to seek employment. For women, the tradi-
tional ideal has been that, in the absence of financial need or particular talent in a given
area, it is preferable for her to stay home and care for her family. See infra notes 12-24 and
accompanying text. Although the reality of labor force participation has varied 'demographical-
ly, the traditional ideal has existed at almost every class level. See infra note 32.
5. In 1960, 23,240,000 women over age sixteen were members of the civilian labor force.
That number rose in 1970 to 31,543,000, and continued to rise: in 1975 it was 37,475,000; in
1980 it was 45,487,000; in 1985 it was 51,050,000; in 1990 it was 56,554,000; and in 1992 it
was 57,798,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 394, Table No. 623. In 1992,
9,500,000 of these employed women had children under the age of six, and 13,200,000 had
children from ages six to seventeen. Of these 22,700,000 mothers employed outside the home
in 1992, 16,800,000 (74 percent) were married with their husband present in the home. Id. at
400, Table No. 633.
6. For example, in 1983, men and women working full-time for either wages or salary
had median weekly earnings of $378 and $252 respectively; in 1985, men and women respec-
tively earned $406 and $277; in 1990, earnings were $485 and $348;' and in 1992, earnings
were $505 and $381. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 426, Table No. 671. See
Hartmann & Aaronson, supra note 1, at 66-67. Although the pay gap has narrowed somewhat,
it remains significant.
7. It is important to distinguish between the work done outside the home at paid labor
and the unpaid work done at home. The popular use of the term "working women" to de-
note women who work in the paid labor force rather than in the home shows that our cul-
tural conceptions devalue that work traditionally done by women in the home. Women who
work in the home work just as much as those who work outside the home-they are simply
not compensated financially for that work. Lack of financial remuneration does not change the
character of the labor performed-it is still work and it should be valued as such.
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en were "allowed" to go to work, as long as they did not neglect their pri-
mary responsibility-care of their home and of their families.
In the mid-1960s, feminist activists sought to raise the consciousness of
the average woman to the crisis of women's rights.8 Political groups were
founded to lobby against sexual discrimination and sexual harassment. As a
result, legislative provisions intended to allow women equal rights were
passed on federal, state, and local levels.9 In the words of a popular ciga-
rette advertisement: "You've come a long way, baby".' °
Despite these advances, the struggle is still not over in 1994. Women in
the labor force continue to earn average salaries far below those earned by
men. The proportional earnings of women have remained relatively constant,
and consistently low, over the past thirty years. There is an appallingly low
percentage of women in high-level positions." The cultural assumptions are
still that, in most double-income families, it is the man's income that is es-
sential, while the woman is earning a paycheck "just to help out."'2 In other
words, the cultural belief is that the man has a career, and his wife has a
job-he is ultimately responsible for finding the money that is needed. 3 Be-
cause men typically earn more than women do-and in our culture money
determines relative power and authority-women are caught in a vicious
cycle that will continue to perpetuate itself. When someone in a family
needs to stay home from work with a sick child, or needs to wait for a
repairman, it is most often the woman who does so." This is an economi-
8. Ironically, feminists have historically been seen by many not as a group for women,
but as a group against men. This characterization is consistent with the cultural pressures that
confine appropriate women to subordinate, supportive roles. The negative connotations applied
to the feminist movement gave credence to hostility directed at its proponents-bias which
still exists today. See Mary J. Eyster, Analysis of Sexism in Legal Practice: A Clinical Approach, 38
J. LEGAL EDUC. 183, 185 n.7 (1988) (noting the negative connotations attached to the terms
'feminist' and 'feminism'); Mary Dunlap, The "F" Word: Mainstreaming and Marginalizing Femi-
nism, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 251, 251-52 (1989) (arguing that the negative connotations
associated with the word "feminist" are a result of society's refusal to accept the feminist
commitment to empower women). See also Women in Law: The Glass Ceiling, A.B.A. J. 49 (June
1, 1988) (chronicling the status of women in the legal profession by examining both statistical
and anecdotal sources of gender bias and hostility).
9. See infra Section Two.
10. Virginia Slims Cigarettes. Note, however, the irony apparent in the tone of this partic-
ular advertising campaign-while praising the progress made towards equal rights for women,
the advertisers chose to refer to women using a term of infantilization.
11. Consider, for example, that the 103d Congress, elected in what was widely heralded
as the "year of the woman," boasts only 53 women as members-less than ten percent of its
total. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 277, Table No. 443.
12. See Rose Laub Coser & Gerald Rokoff, Women in the Occupational World: Social Disrup-
tion and Conflict, WOMEN AND WORK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 39, 44 (Rachel Kahn-Hut,
Arlene Kaplan Daniels, & Richard Colvard eds., 1982).
13. See Myra H. Strober, Two-Earner Families, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN, AND THE NEW FAMI-
LIES 161, 177-78 (Sanford M. Dornbusch & Myra H. Strober eds., 1988) (noting that, in dual-
career families, it is generally the wife who accommodates her career to family responsibili-
ties).
14. Coser & Rokoff, supra note 12, at 42. See J. Paul Leigh, Sex Differences in Absenteeism,
Vol. 22, No. 3 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 349, 360 (1983) (noting that "women apparently assume
more responsibility for children and report more absences [from work] as the number of
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cally rational choice-she is usually the one who earns less money so her
presence at work is therefore less valuable.
Cultural norms work strongly to tie women to the home. There is an
inherent value placed on the mother-child bond in our society. Women are
socialized to be nurturing and caring, while men are socialized to be ambi-
tious and career-oriented. Women are then "better" at childcare and organiz-
ing the home because society has prepared them for such a role. Women are
more likely to feel responsible for a clean house, while men are more likely
to say that it does not matter. 5 If a man chooses to stay at home with his
children rather than work outside the home, and therefore chooses to place a
greater importance on his wife's career than on his own, that family is
looked upon as not quite normal. 6
Even in homes where both parents work and arrangements have been
made for paid help to assist with childcare and housework, it is still the
woman who directs and supervises domestic maintenance. 7 When men and
women speak of performing household duties, the usual description of
young children in the household increases"); Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the
Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1201-02 (1991) (noting that
"[e]mployers expect absenteeism and limited job tenure of married women, who may leave
their jobs to have children or to follow their husbands to a new job").
15. Housework and childcare are still seen as primarily the woman's responsibility even
in homes where both spouses work outside the home in equally demanding careers. See, e.g.,
ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT (1989) (finding that in families where both parents
work outside the home, men do not contribute equally to care of the household, thus result-
ing in women putting in a 'second shift' both before and after they go outside the home to
work equivalent to an extra month of work per year as compared to their husbands). See also
Strober, supra note 13, at 168-72 (surveying evidence and noting that women employed out-
side the home deal with their increased time pressures by decreasing the time spent on
household production, volunteer and community work, leisure, and sleep, but that the de-
crease in time spent is insufficient to explain the gender wage gap because time-use studies
demonstrate that women work more intensely than do men).
The institutions of our popular culture play a large role in perpetuating gender role
assumptions. The norm that women are responsible for childcare and housework is assumed
in advertisements for foods, cleaning aids, and children's toys and clothes-in almost every
television advertisement for these products, women are shown as the primary actors. Adher-
ence to appropriate gender roles is also apparent in children's cartoons, television shows, and
books. See Today Show: Working Mother Magazine Survey on Sexism in Cartoons (NBC Television
Broadcast, Dec. 31, 1990); Katha Pollitt, The Smurfette Principle, N. Y. TIMES MAc. 8-10 (April
7, 1991). These images are powerful components of children's education--one study indicated
that eighty percent of children have television characters as role models. Today Show, supra.
16. See Coser & Rokoff, supra note 12, at 44 (noting that "[tihere is a negative connota-
tion to the term 'career woman.' . . . [nlo such derogatory term exists for men, since their
careers are taken for granted"). See also BEJAMIN SPOCK, M.D., DR. SPOCK ON PARENTING 28-
33, 42-81 (1988) (discussing the importance of proper sex role identification, proper mothering,
and a father's appropriate role in childrearing).
17. See Joseph H. Pleck, The Work-Family Role System, in WOMEN AND WORK, supra note
12, at 101, 102-103. In dual-career families where equitable divisions of labor between husband
and wife are achieved, the solution is generally dependent on the hiring of another woman to
provide childcare and housework for low wages. See ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN
OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL-CAREER MARRIAGES 159 (1986) (noting that hiring an
individual is the most common form of childcare arrangement in dual-career families, but that
such a system creates career opportunities for some women by denying those opportunities to
other women).
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men's participation is that he "helps" with "her" housework; she hires and
instructs the cleaning woman and the baby-sitter. In other words, we have
progressed to the point where a woman is allowed to delegate her responsi-
bilities in the home, but it is still clearly her responsibility to make sure the
children are cared for and the house is clean.
The behavior of women contributes to the perpetuation of traditional
gender roles as much as does the behavior of men. Sociologically, women
tend to conform to their expected roles, and therefore sacrifice some of their
growth potential at work. Women tend to show less attachment to the labor
force than do men, particularly when they have children.8 While men usu-
ally cite inability to find work as their reason for staying home, women are
more likely to say they have to attend to household duties. 9
Debates about parental leave and childcare seem to hover more often
around the question of whether women should be working, and the effect
that a mother who works outside the home has on her children's well-being,
rather than on the specifics of an actual policy.' A woman is criticized for
her lack of dedication to her job if she is unable to maintain a strict separa-
tion between work and family.2 Yet a man who allows his work to en-
croach upon his family time is rewarded for his ambition.' Although many
families are able to work out equitable solutions, the structure of the discus-
sion of childcare and women's choices shows the inequity inherent in our
cultural division of labor. There is not the same urgency applied to the par-
allel choices men make-for men, childcare is an option, not an expectation.
18. See Leigh, supra note 14, at 349, 360; Crain, supra note 14, at 1200-02.
19. In 1975, 79.2 percent of women and 1.5 percent of men reported that keeping house
was their reason for being out of the labor force. In 1988 that response came from 62.7 per-
cent of women and 2.3 percent of men. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Jan. 1976, Table 29
and Jan. 1989, Table A-54, as compiled in SARA RIX, THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-91: A STATUS
REPORT 382 Fig. 7 (1991).
20. See, e.g., Strober, supra note 13, at 161. See also Janet G. Hunt & Larry L. Hunt, Dilem-
mas and Contradictions of Status: The Case of the Dual-Career Family, in WOMEN AND WORK,
supra note 12, at 183-84 (noting that the focus of discussions about management of household
in the transition from "two-person careers" to "two-career families" demonstrates that the
contribution of the traditional wife has been discounted).
21. See Crain, supra note 14, at 1178-79. Crain notes:
At best, women who occupy roles as both workers and mothers are seen as having
a 'conflict of allegiance' between home and work. Because complete loyalty to the
employer and the job is the male norm in the public sphere, attempts by women to
accommodate the two spheres are perceived as evidencing a lack of commitment to
the work world. Thus, women workers are caught in a catch-22: they are perceived
as aggressive and unfeminine if they do not assume primary responsiblity for child
care and family obligations, and as uninterested in market work if they attempt to
juggle both roles.
Id. (citations omitted).
22. See ROBERT S. WEISS, STAYING THE COURSE: THE EMOTIONAL AND SOCIAL LIVES OF MEN
WHO DO WELL AT WORK (1990) (concluding that men can only be successful at work if they
have a wife at home whose primary responsibility is the care of the household and the chil-
dren); Martha H. Peak, Fathers Earn The Most ...When Their Wives Stay Home, Vol. 83, No. 2
MGMT. REV. 6 (1994) (finding that "[t]raditional married men-those who have children and
whose wives don't work--earn an average twenty percent more per annum than family men
with children and employed wives").
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Although women are moving out of the home ,and into the job market
in increasing numbers, there has been no parallel movement of men into the
domestic sphere. Consequently women are increasingly called upon to be
superwomen-to juggle responsibility for both career and family, while
maintaining a strict separation. The problem becomes apparent when one
considers that women are still working with the same resources, but trying
to accomplish twice as much. Women are often expected to handle both
career and family with little or no structural assistance.' Simultaneously,
however, women are told that the reason they earn less money than men do
and have less prestige in the job market is not because of unfair discrimi-
nation, but instead because they are not as reliable as men, are unlikely to
devote full attention to their job, and do not have the same wealth of experi-
ence or the same levels of education.
A. DEVALUATION OF WOMEN AND WOMEN'S WORK: EXPLAINING GENDER
INEQUITIES IN EMPLOYMENT
The work that women do, both in the labor force and in the home,
tends to be supportive,' a quality traditionally associated with femininity."'
23. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 15 (finding that, in families where both parents work out-
side the home, men do not contribute equally to care of the household, thus resulting in
women putting in a 'second shift,' both before and after they go outside the home to work,
equivalent to an extra month of work per year as compared to their husbands).
24. See JUDITH D. AUERBACH, IN THE BUSINESS OF CHILD CARE (1988). In discussing "the
ideology of mothering that locates primary responsibility for the care of children with mothers
in the privacy of their homes," Auerbach notes:
This ideology [of mothering] contends that it is natural and necessary for mothers to
care for their small children, that they should do so in their own homes, and that it
is therefore inappropriate for mothers to work outside the home if it conflicts with
this responsibility. It also contends that there is no place for public involvement or
expenditure in such a private, family activity. Extrafamilial child care is thus resisted
by many in our society because of the belief that nurturance is woman's work, that
it is not something that should be compensated, and that government should not
intervene in the private lives of families and family members.
Id. at 10.
25. In 1992, for example, while women were 99 percent of all dental assistants, they were
only 8.5 percent of all dentists. Women were 98.6 percent of all kindergarten and pre-school
teachers and 85.4 percent of all elementary school teachers but only 40.9 percent of all college
or university level teachers. Similarly, women were 99 percent of all secretaries, 97.3 percent
of all receptionists, 95.9 percent of all childcare workers, cleaners, and servants employed in
private homes, 98.7 percent of all out of home childcare workers, 87.6 percent of all librari-
ans, 79.6 percent of all waiter/waitresses, and 87.7 percent of all welfare service aides, but
only 8.5 percent of all engineers, 3.3 percent of all repairers or mechanics, and 4.6 percent of
all truck drivers. Women were 94.3 percent of all registered nurses, 89.4 percent of all nurs-
ing aides, orderlies, and attendants, and 76.7 percent of all legal assistants, but only 20.4 per-
cent of all physicians and 21.4 percent of all lawyers and judges. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, supra note 1, at 405-7, Table No. 644.
26. See Crain, supra note 14, at 1201 (noting that "[w]omen's early socialization teaches
them to expect to spend their lives as housewives and mothers, encouraging a career only
when it is an extension of the serving, subordinate role in the family"); KRISTEN M. SWANSON-
KAUFFMAN, WOMEN'S WORK, FAMILIES AND HEALTH: THE BALANCING ACT 14 (1987) (comment-
ing: "[miother: another word for lover, nurturer, protector, cheerleader, madonna, martyr,
carpooler, and cookie-baker. . . . [c]areer: a metaphor for commitment, status, security, chal-
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There is an inverse relationship between the percentage of women employed
in a field, and the average hourly salary in that field.' The cultural percep-
tion of "women's work" is that its purpose is primarily to help, rather than
to do, and that it requires supervision and direction. The obvious trend of
feminine predominance in certain fields has socialized our society into be-
lieving that these jobs are appropriate for women, and consequently, inap-
propriate for men." Sex-segregation of jobs is a significant factor in the
lower earning potential of women.
Economic models, particularly neo-classical29 and segmented labor mar-
ket theories," provide insight into the lower earnings of women. There are
lenge, travel, competition, success, and choice").
27. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 428, Table No. 673. Women
also earn less than men even in the same fields. See id.
28. A myth of gender-appropriate occupations continues to dominate in our culture. One
Gallup poll asked the question: "Supposing a young man (woman) came to you for advice on
choosing a line of work or career. What kind of work or career would you recommend?" The
reported answers indicated that there were fourteen career recommendations mentioned for
men, and nineteen suggestions for women. Of the nineteen suggestions for women, there
were six choices that were not ever mentioned for men-nursing, secretarial, housewife, social
work, merchandising, and civil service. Computers, engineering, skilled crafts, electronics, law,
military, accounting, and auto mechanics, however, were all mentioned as choices for men
significantly more often than for women. Teaching was also mentioned for both men and
women-it came up, however, more than twice as often for women than it did for men.
Survey No. 253-G, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION (1985).
29. The neoclassical approach to the labor market is based on several assumptions: first,
the value of an employee's services is determined by the individual's productivity; second,
labor can be viewed as a commodity, and as such, it necessarily conforms to the inherent
systems of supply and demand. Therefore, the most efficient system will be one in which the
market is allowed to function without interference, and the wage paid to a worker in a free
market is the true and best measure of that individual worker's productivity. The neoclassical
economic explanation for the gender pay gap rests on the tenets of supply and de-
mand-simply stated; there is too much labor available. Because the supply of labor so far
outweighs the demand for workers, employers find it necessary to rank prospective employees
according to potential productivity, and therefore distribute jobs based on the employer's
speculation with respect to a worker's potential. Inherent in the evaluation of potential pro-
ductivity is a tendency to weight decisions according to personal preferences. Because the
employers making these decisions are predominantly men who are operating in a system
weighted towards the preference of men, employers will tend to choose men over women. In
other words, gender inequity in employment is a vicious cycle-as long as women remain
disproportionately represented in lower level jobs, they will continue to be denied access to
the influence necessary to affect the allocation system, and will continue to be relegated to
lower level jobs. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on Employment
Sex Discrimination Law and Comparable Worth 21 RUTGERS L. J. 269, 326-41 (1990).
30. The segmented labor market model differs from the neoclassical model in its basic
assumption that neither the economy as a whole, nor individual labor markets, operate under
a single set of rules. In other words, the labor market is segmented. See generally PETER B.
DOERINGER & MICHAEL J. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER ANALYSIS (1985).
Doeringer and Piore address the lack of mobility in low-income labor markets, finding that
the labor market is segmented according to whether jobs are filled by competitive or by ad-
ministrative means. The internal labor market, which governs mobility within fields, is con-
trolled by administrative rules and procedures. The external market is controlled by economic
factors, such as the rules of supply and demand, and the evaluation of human capital. Com-
petition only exists at the entry level, or in the external market; after that advancement de-
pends on movement along mobility chains that are determined by the internal market. Upper
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two major factors that emerge from a discussion of these economic theories
to account for the gender pay gap. First, women are different from men in
terms of education, work experience, and labor force attachment. Because
women are not as free to make investments in their human capital, they are
more likely to settle for low-cost, low-return jobs at the expense of a higher
earning potential. Although this difference between the average investment
in human capital level of men and women may be lessening, it is a slow
process, and the effect on the market is not yet apparent. Second, in the
determination of human capital, work history and labor force attachment are
considered values that the market neither can nor should be expected to
remedy. In the market at large, men are categorically assigned a higher level
of work experience and labor force attachment based on a rational gamble
that workers adhere to traditional gender roles.3 If traditional gender roles
are adhered to, women who enter the job market have typically prepared for
two types of employment-work in the home and work in the market-and
have then split their available resources between two separate occupations.
All women then earn less because the cultural assumption is that each indi-
vidual woman will act in accordance with the norm and thus be more likely
to choose a job that requires less training, has little risk attached, does not
require physical labor, and allows workers to enter and leave the labor force
multiple times. As a group, men do not have the drain on their resources
that women do, and are therefore at an advantage in the development of
their human capital. Women are not able to compete effectively with men in
the labor market due to the traditional feminine association with the family
and the domestic sphere.
Economic models do provide insight into the lower earnings of women
relative to men, but theories based on the workings of a free market are
only one part of the larger picture. Although there is a value to explanation,
a descriptive economic model is inherently limited to exposition; it has no
remedial value. Regardless of explanations, there remains the inescapable fact
that the value of women's work, both in the home and in the labor market,
has been consistently devalued throughout history.
It is clear that our culture adheres strongly to rigid definitions of gen-
der-appropriate characteristics and behavior; these cultural beliefs translate in
the labor market to gender-appropriate divisions of labor and occupational
segregation.32 Men's participation in the labor force is usually discussed in
level jobs are designed for mobility. Lower level jobs, on the other hand, are more specific,
and have fewer opportunities for advancement. Id. at 165-69. Women tend to be
overrepresented in these lower level jobs. See supra note 25. The implication is that, whatever
the reason for women's original placement in these lower level jobs, the likelihood that any
individual worker will remain in a lower paying job is explained by the rules of the market.
The association of a job with men, and consequently with masculine characteristics,
makes it worth more in the market. The association of a job with women, and consequently
with lower-valued feminine characteristics, makes it worth less. See Awilda R. Marquez, Com-
parable Worth and the Maryland Era, 47 MD. L. REV. 1129, 1150 (1988) (noting that "[j]obs are
undervalued because women hold them").
31. But compare this cultural tendency to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, infra note
99, finding unconstitutional laws treating men and women differently based on statistically
verified differences in the aggregate.
32. The 'myth of separate worlds' is one explanation for the way the idea of women's
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the context of a job-model, while similar discussions about women's partici-
pation tend to occur in the context of a gender-model.33 The masculine job-
model emphasizes working conditions, opportunities, and problems encoun-
tered therein as the primary source of explanations for what men do at and
want from work. The gender-model, on the other hand, tends to ignore job
type and working conditions, focussing instead on personal characteristics,
family circumstances, and an assumed "family first" commitment in explain-
ing how women feel about their paid jobs and what they do at them.' The
behavior of women, and the societal constructs which encourage it, are as
much an issue in pay equity as is the behavior of men and the behavior of
employers.
If, for the sake of argument, we accept the proposition that women
desire to make different choices than men do, the next logical question still
must be: Why are our social norms such that women's work is devalued?
Stereotypical views of the differences between boys and girls affect how each
individual develops a personality and assumes a role in society." Part of
work became delineated from the idea of men's work. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND
WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977). Prior to the industrial revolution, according to Kanter,
there was no real separation of home and work; consequently, there were no clearly delin-
eated separate domains for men and women. This is not to say that men and women were
the same; there has always been a separation between appropriate feminine attributes and
behaviors and appropriate masculine attributes and behaviors. The pre-industrial cultural
norms did not extend, however, to the point of separate spheres for each gender. There was
simply a difference in the type of behavior that was socially acceptable for men and for
women within any given sphere. With the growth of industry and urbanization, however, the
separate spheres of family and work were created. As these separate spheres developed, men
became associated with the role of wage-earner, while women became associated with the role
of homemaker; men became associated with the concept of public, women became associated
with the concept of private. Family and work came to be seen as separate domains that
should not be combined. The association of men and women with the different spheres then
came to imply a difference in capabilities and potential. As time went on, men and women
conformed to the myth and each sex became proficient within its separate domain, and less
competent in the domain of the other. Although the actual separation of public and private
domains was not a reality for the majority of America, it was for the upper-class. Lower- and
middle-class families often had to have two or more earners in order to survive economically.
Because of the upper-class association, however, the concept of separate spheres for men and
women evolved into a norm to which members of all classes aspired. The social conditioning
which resulted from the rise of this norm led to the widespread belief during the twentieth
century in the essential nature of the separation of work from family, and the resulting sepa-
ration of appropriate gender roles. Id.
33. Roslyn L. Feldberg & Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Male and Female: Job Versus Gender Models
in the Sociology of Work, in WOMEN AND WORK, supra note 12, at 65.
34. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text. See also David W. Moore & Alec Gallup,
Male Bosses Still Preferred Over Female Bosses, GALLUP POLL NEWS SERVICE (1993) (noting partic-
ularly that women express more sexist views than men in their choice of boss).
35. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982).
In support of the notion that family is conceived of as a woman's primary responsi-
bility, consider, for example, the teachings of Dr. Benjamin Spock-"The Baby Doctor"-a
veritable cultural icon. For years, millions of mothers have listened to Dr. Spock religiously
and raised their children according to his prescriptions. Like most other influential
childrearing authorities of the last century, Dr. Spock includes in each edition of his book
maxims supporting the ubiquitous cultural belief in the inherent value of mothering, as op-
Volume 1:119 1994
ARE WOMEN WORTH As MUCH As MEN? 129
the way in which people view the sexes differently involves ascribing differ-
ent reasons for success and failure to women and to men. In other words,
people tend to believe that there are some things that a woman will do well,
and other things that she will not do well-based on her gender, rather than
on her individual aptitudes.' The same process applies to men. This is,
however, a subtle process. Gender-based occupational segregation is related
posed to parenting or fathering. In his original 1945 edition, Spock includes a final chapter
entitled "Special Problems". The table of contents lists the following subsections: Traveling
With a Baby; The Premature Baby; Twins; Separated Parents; The Working Mother; The Father-
less Child; The Handicapped Child; and The Adopted Child. BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D., THE
COMMON SENSE BOOK OF BABY AND CHILDCARE (1945) (emphasis added). Under the subtitle
"The Working Mother," Spock admonishes: "[i]f a mother realized how vital her love and
care is to a small child, it may make it easier to decide that the extra money she might re-
ceive from an outside job is not so important after all." Id. at 484. The same sentence ap-
peared in the 1970 edition, but by that time the 'problem' of working mothers had acquired a
more prominent position-it appeared on page three. BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D., BABY AND
CHILDCARE (1970).
Dr. Spock made substantial revisions to his influential book three decades after its origi-
nal publication. In the 1976 edition, Spock removed the heading of working mothers from the
section on special situations and added an introduction advocating egalitarian parenting. BEN-
JAMIN SPOCK, M.D., BABY AND CHILDCARE (1976). He admonishes both parents to recognize
the equal right of each to a career, and encourages parents to make an attempt to be equally
involved in parenting. He does note that it will most often be the mother who is the primary
caretaker, but insists it should be her choice to be so. In his 1985 edition, Dr. Spock betrays
his new egalitarian stance, however, in his differential advice to men and women in the sec-
tion on children with only one parent. Under the heading of The Fatherless Child he advises:
"The mother's spirit is most important .... The important thing is for her to go on being a
normal human being, keeping up her friendships, her recreations, her outside career if she
has had one, at least on a part-time basis, and her outside activities as far as she can." BEN-
JAMIN SPOCK, M.D. & MICHAEL B. ROTHENBERG, BABY AND CHILDCARE 672-73 (1985). To the
father of a motherless child, however, he offers diametrically opposed advice:
The father in most cases will have to stick to a full-time job; but he should scrupu-
lously reserve the major part of his after-work hours to be with his child. . . . If
his social or romantic interests are pressing he can do a lot of his entertaining at
home and try to get his child included in his invitations to dine with others.
Id. at 674. Spock appears here to be reinforcing a stereotype that says women should take
primary responsibility for childcare. As a result of that primary responsibility, a mother
would be more likely to be over-involved in her child's life, while a father would be more
likely to be under-involved. See SPOCK, supra note 16, at 28-31, 31 (1988 version, discussing
whether "a mother of a baby or preschool child should go back to an outside job"). With
respect to a parent's decision to work outside the home, Dr. Spock notes:
For many women the best compromise, when it is possible, is to start with
part-time work....
In fairness, a father should be willing to cut down to a part-time job so that
the mother won't have to sacrifice so much of her outside work time. But some
fathers are still not ready to think of themselves as care givers, and even in families wher
the father is willing to assume such a role, this may not be practical.
Id. at 31 (emphasis added). But see BENJAMIN SPOCK, M.D., & MICHAEL B. ROTHENBERG, M.D.,
DR. SPOCK's BABY AND CHILD CARE 27-31, 30 (1992) (noting that child care should be equally
shared by mothers and fathers and that "[tlhe subordination of women is brought about by
countless small acts beginning in early childhood. . . . [of] thoughtless expressions of preju-
dice or of old tradition").
36. See Richard M. Levinson, Sex Discrimination and Employment Practices: An Experiment
with Unconventional Job Inquiries, in WOMEN AND WORK, supra note 12, at 54; Crain, supra note
11, at 1168.
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to the perceived attributes of men versus those of women; because it is the
qualities associated with being male rather than the fact of one's gender that
gain someone a more favorable position in society and the labor market, the
phenomenon of male bias in rewarding work is difficult to regulate. It is not
overt gender discrimination that is occurring. Rather, it is a cultural tenden-
cy to view certain characteristics as more favorable, while simultaneously
tending to assign those qualities to a given gender. If a job is perceived as
one requiring typically feminine attributes, it will be paid less because the
subjective, cultural evaluation of the attributes required by the job is that
they are inherently less valuable to society. If a woman is doing either a
neutral job, or one which is viewed as requiring masculine characteristics,
she will be seen as bringing to that job her feminine attributes, and the
cultural tendency will be to pay her less for the same work." In other
words, the cultural devaluation of women leads to the cultural devaluation
of women's work, which in turn contributes to the gender pay gap.
B. MOTHERHOOD: A LOFTY PROFESSION UNWORTHY OF COMPENSATION?
Our culture places a higher ideological value on mothering than on
fathering or parenting. Women are assumed to be better primary caretakers,
and gender roles prescribe mothering as a norm for women.' The reality
that mothering is a financially uncompensated time commitment almost
exclusively assigned to women, in synergy with the cultural connotations of
the word mother, substantially contributes to gender inequities in employ-
ment. Yet the fact is that parenting talent is not synonymous with gen-
der-prescriptive gender roles assigning the role of caretaker to women and
the role of breadwinner to men hurt both men and women.
Because only women can bear children,39 and children need care, the
universal expectation has been that motherhood should be the central role
and responsibility in a woman's life. 0 Demographic changes have occurred,
however, that should affect this expectation. First, although women are still
the only gender capable of bearing children, the fact is that they are having
37. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE 93 (D. J.
Treiman & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1981) (finding that "several types of evidence support our
judgment that it is true in many instances that jobs which are held mainly by women and
minorities pay less at least partly because they are held mainly by women and minorities").
38. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
39. Although the medical technology has been developed to produce 'test-tube' babies, the
process has not yet become a norm in American culture, and is not likely to become one in
the near future.
40. Plato is a notable exception. He made the revolutionary suggestion that women of the
'guardian' or upper class should be educated and allowed the same opportunities as the men
of that class, and should not, therefore, be burdened with childcare. Even Plato, however, felt
that the care of the children of the community (who were to be held in common) should be
administered by nurses, who were to be drawn from the women of the third class. Mothering
was still to be women's work, it was just that some women were to be exempt. In a way
then, Plato even contributed further to the devaluation of the work childcare by suggesting
that women of the upper class would benefit from the exemption. See THE REPUBLIC OF PLA-
TO (Francis M. Cornford ed., 1945).
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fewer children.4' Logic would dictate that, because women are having fewer
children, childrearing has become a less time-consuming occupation. The
increase in average age at marriage42 and the increase in average life-expec-
tancy,43 would also tend to indicate that women are devoting a smaller per-
centage of their lives to raising children. Yet women remain culturally tied
by prescriptive gender roles to a career which is no longer enough to occu-
py an entire lifetime. Yet as women pursue other avenues toward fulfill-
ment, the care of a family is still enough to interfere with a woman's pursuit
of a successful career in the labor market. Although the demands of
childcare have declined, they have not disappeared, and other, acceptable
alternatives to replace the full-time homemaker have not yet emerged.
It has been argued that the cultural belief that women should mother,
and that mothering is inherently valuable to both woman and child, is a
socially reproduced concept." Men and women, and boys and girls, are
different because they are exposed to different attitudes, expectations, and
assumptions about their interests and potential accomplishments. Women are
taught to nurture and to express their feelings;45 men are taught to suppress
their emotions and to seek objective success, such as the success gained by
doing well at work.46 The cultural assumptions about gender-appropriate
behaviors, and the resulting stereotypes and assumptions about gender-spe-
cific capabilities and aptitudes, lead women to the work of childcare. Men
are not taught the necessary nurturing skills, and are therefore socially un-
prepared to do well at childcare.
A poignant example of the way law reflects society's prescribed gender
roles with respect to parenting is the way child support is assessed against,
and collected from, non-custodial parents. Across world regimes, the devel-
opment of family law since 1960 has embodied change from principles of
interdependence and specific gender roles within the family to the domina-
tion of a view based on ideals of individualism and gender equality.47 This
change in paradigm, however, has failed to address the fact that women are
still the caretakers. Family law continues to actively promote gender alloca-
tion of household labor and childrearing responsibilities, but has de-empha-
sized the interdependence aspect of the original model, thus removing the
41. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS supra note 1, at 73, Table No. 91.
42. See id. at 101, Table No. 142.
43. See id. at 85, Table No. 115.
44. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978) (arguing that the tendency in women to nurture, and therefore
to mother, grows ou to fthe psychodynamics of the mother-child relationship itself). See also
ELIZABETH DEBOLD, MARIE WILSON, & IDELISSE MALAVE, MOTHER DAUGHTER REVOLUTION: FROM
BETRAYAL TO POWER (1993) (excerpt reprinted in this volume, Elizabeth Debold, Marie Wilson,
& Idelisse Malavd, From Betrayal To Power, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & P. 50 (1994)).
45. See DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND (1990); GILLIGAN, supra note 35.
46. See Jack W. Sattel, The Inexpressive Male: Tragedy or Sexual Politics?, in WOMEN AND
WORK, supra note 12, at 160 (noting additionally that male inexpressiveness forces women to
do the additional work of understanding men, helping men to express their emotions, and do
the work of expressing men's emotions for them).
47. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND
FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE passim (1989).
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support that used to balance the additional responsibility placed on wom-
en.
48
A good analysis of the stereotypical childcare model under which cur-
rent policy operates to assign responsibility for children is the volunteer-
draftee dichotomy.49 In the volunteer-draftee paradigm, fathers are defined
as volunteer parents; mothers are defined as draftees.' Equal valuation is
given to non-intrusive financial support and intensive, daily caretaking re-
sponsibilities; fathers are then given social support and reinforcement when
they act as "volunteer" parents. But while a father's mandated duties toward
his children are limited to financial support and do not include caretaking
responsibilities, his autonomy with respect to parenting is broadly protected.
Fathers retain both the right to avoid a family relationship, and the privilege
to gain one with minimal effort."' Mothers, on the other hand, are draftee
parents-their duties toward their children are extensive and include provid-
ing services and intensive caretaking in addition to the responsibility of
financial support which they sometimes share with the father. A mother's
autonomy in parenting, however, receives little protection-a mother can
neither require an unwilling father to provide a family relationship, nor can
she avoid the imposition of a family relationship on herself by a father who
does wish to have one. 2 Evidence of adherence to the volunteer-draftee
model can be found in the Supreme Court's pronouncement that all a bio-
logical father must do to become a constitutionally protected father is to
volunteer to do a small bit of the job of parent-he may even choose which
small bit he wishes to perform. 3 The court views the biological father as
having an "opportunity" to establish a relationship with his child; the penalty
to the father upon failure to voluntarily assume parental responsibilities is,
at most, loss of parental rights, and is more often mere assessment of finan-
cial obligation. The mother, in contrast, is viewed as bearing a responsibility
to develop a parental relationship: her penalty for failure to do so can go so
far as to include criminal neglect charges.'
Public policy with respect to the question of who bears ultimate respon-
sibility for our children has been utterly silent on the question of whether
48. Id.
49. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality, 38
UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1415 (1991).
50. Id. at 1416.
51. Id. at 1423.
52. The protection of a father's parental autonomy necessarily reduces that of the mother
because he is able to establish his rights in ways that will encroach upon her autonomy. A
father may, for example, establish his parental rights with monthly visits with his children,
and then object to a custodial mother's plans to move to a new location to pursue an em-
ployment or educational opportunity. Should he wish to move, however, the only ramification
with respect to his family relationship will be that he bears the burden of arranging to con-
tinue his visits. There is no possibility the father's autonomy right to move where he wishes
will be denied. See id. at 1420-21.
53. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 n.18 (1983) (noting that the mere mailing of
a postcard to the putative father registry would have been sufficient to entitle a putative fa-
ther to notice of, and opportunity to object to, pending adoption proceedings).
54. See Czapanskiy, supra note 49, at 1415-22.
ARE WOMEN WORTH As MUCH As MEN? 133
the allocation of financial responsibility to fathers and caretaking responsibili-
ty to mothers is appropriate.5 A salient example is the reigning public poli-
cy approach to enforcement of child support obligations. Our national family
policy does not accept the notion of a true single parent as an acceptable
norm. Where such single parents exist, the law imposes a financial obligation
on the absent non-custodial parent and attempts to collect that support mon-
ey with no regard for the law of diminishing returns. The current system
imposes a norm of two parents with some degree of responsibility (however
unequally allocated) to the point of ignoring the reality of many custodial
single mothers, and abdicating any responsibility for providing a support
network that will be of real value in aiding her in her fulfillment of her
childrearing responsibilities. Ignoring the immense needs of custodial parents
for systemic support, while focusing instead on the failure of non-custodial
parents to fulfill their nominal duties, indicates a peculiar view of the impor-
tance of assuring the quality of childrearing in our society. The low valua-
tion placed on the work of childrearing, combined with the social and legal
assignment of that responsibility to women, results in a devaluation of wom-
en and the work they do.
C. DUAL RESPONSIBILITIES: THE SOURCE OF GENDER INEQUITIES IN EMPLOY-
MENT
The movement of women into the labor force is a phenomenon that
seems not to threaten men on any significant level.' The current system,
however, leaves many women with concurrent careers; one of domestic re-
sponsibilities and a second of paid labor outside the home." As long as
women have to split their attention between career and family, they will not
succeed in a market system where dedication is required for success. The
segregation of women into lower paying jobs tends to reinforce the system.
As long as men are more successful-as success is currently defined-at
paid labor than women, men will continue to have careers, while women
will continue to have jobs.
55. See generally Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility
and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 367.
56. See Laura Vertz, The New Feminist Politics, in Do ELECTIONS MATTER? 134-47 (Benjamin
Ginsberg & Alan Stone eds., 1986) (noting that public opinion polls have consistently indicat-
ed that men are as likely as women to support equal rights, childcare provisions, maternity
leave policies, and other issues that are generally identified as women's issues). Men's support
of women's equal rights in the public sphere seems to be conditional, however, on an under-
standing that there is not a simultaneous expectation of shared male and female responsibil-
ities in the domestic sphere. See supra notes 12-24 and accompanying text.
57. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 15. The greatest compliment a woman of the post-sexual
revolution era can receive seems to be that of 'superwoman, one who can do everything'.
This ideal is epitomized in the popular perfume commercial of the 1970s which showed a
woman who went from carrying a briefcase, to standing in the kitchen wearing an apron, to
serving her man a drink in a cocktail dress, all the while singing-"I can bring home the
bacon, fry it up in a pan, and never, never let you forget you're a man . . . cuz I'm a
WOMAN!" Enjoli Perfume. The message is that if a woman feels that she has to work, it is
all right, as long as she does not neglect children, husband, or home.
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Women's search for equality of opportunity in the job market is hin-
dered by the lack of an emotional support system in the family such as has
traditionally been provided by the domestic wife. 8 One function of the tra-
ditional family is to provide a "haven in a heartless world".9 The question
has now become: who will maintain the haven when both husband and wife
are working? The answer lies in the elimination of gender-specific roles and
expectations. The family is important, and it needs to be maintained. Wom-
en, however, are neither inherently nor exclusively capable of maintaining a
haven. Institutionalized support systems for childcare and parental leave,
combined with an elimination of the expectation that women must take
primary responsibility for the family by virtue of their gender rather than in-
dividual aptitude or interest, will allow for equality of opportunity for both
men and women, while simultaneously providing for the continuation of the
family. All children need care. The issue is not that women do not want to
care for children; many women do find fulfillment in childcare. The biologi-
cal accident of one's gender, however, should not be the dominant factor in
determining one's appropriate occupation. Removal of the stigma of choosing
a gender-inappropriate occupation will allow many more men the opportuni-
ty to participate equally in childcare, and will allow women greater choice in
determining their careers. Appropriately valuing the work of childcare and
childrearing will encourage more people who find fulfillment in such work
to devote their time to it.
D. THE ROLE OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE PERPETUATION OF
PRESCRIPTIVE GENDER ROLES
Longstanding legal tradition in this country presumes that a woman's
primary responsibility is for her home and her children, and that a man's
primary responsibility is the economic care of his family.' These presump-
tions have formed the basis of many of the laws and policies of our govern-
ment,61 which in turn perpetuate a cultural bias toward prescriptive gender
58. Compare supra note 22 (noting that men are more successful at work when they have
the domestic support of a traditional wife, one who does not work outside the home).
59. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN HEARTLESS WORLD (1977).
60. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L. J. 1073 (1994).
61. For example, the provisions of the Social Security system are still premised on the
one-earner family in which the earner is typically male, and the legal codification of marriage
and divorce in this country is still stacked in favor of traditional gender roles. See Mary E.
Becker, Commentary: Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone,
Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 (1989). Becker notes
that, because most law students' only exposure to the social security system occurs in their
classes on constitutional law, the way the issue is addressed in casebooks leaves them:
[to] graduate with the impression that the Supreme Court decisions have elim-
inated sex discrimination in the social security system except, perhaps, to the extent
that women receive a benefit denied their spouses under the odd cases allowing
some distinctions beneficial to women. ...
Modern equal protection doctrine gives lip service to equality in marginal
cases (e.g. social security cases banning express distinctions between women and
men), but leaves intact laws favoring breadwinners relative to homemakers (the
basic structure of the social security system).
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roles,' and support a notion that work in the labor market is valuable, but
the work of raising children is the private folly of parents.63 The effect of
assigning a monetary value to work done outside the home, but not accord-
ing a parallel value to that done inside the home is a devaluation of the
women that perform that work.'
Institutional devaluation of women is a powerful precedent. It involves
more than a simple statute in the law books-it is a concrete manifestation
and enforcer of cultural beliefs. The reality is that women are more willing
to step into the traditionally male sphere of paid employment than men are
to step into the sphere of domestic work. Public policy has supported the
devaluation of women's work in the past. The interaction of social and legal
Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted). See Camilla E. Watson, The Pension Game: Age- and Gender-
Based Inequities in the Retirement System, 25 GA. L. REV. 1 (1990) (noting that both employer-
provided and government retirement systems not only fail to meet the needs of many wom-
en, but also blatantly discriminate against them in many ways); Bob Kamman, How the IRS
Sticks It to Spouses, NAT'L. L. J. 17 (Nov. 15, 1993) (arguing that, because the IRS allows the
primary named person on a return to designate a lawyer or accountant to represent the filers
but not the second named person, women-who are traditionally listed second on joint tax
returns-are discriminated against). Kamman points particularly to cases where joint filers
may have been married at the time of filing but are divorced at the time of controversy. If
the husband was the first name listed and he designated an attorney, this IRS policy then
deprives the wife of the opportunity to be represented by counsel or even by an accountant
in the dispute, regardless of the potential effects on the division of property and liability in a
perhaps pending divorce action. Id.
62. One way in which the social security system, for example, could be restructured is to
implement a policy of earnings sharing. See Becker, supra note 61, at 286-88. Earnings sharing
would eliminate all provisions in the law giving social security benefits to dependents, and
replace them with a new method of allocating contributions during marriage. Under the new
plan, each partner to a marriage would receive credit for one-half of all wages earned by
either spouse. The breadwinner and the homemaker would thus end up with identical social
security credits based on the total of their joint earnings. Homemaker coverage is not a novel
concept, and several countries currently do provide equitable national pension coverage for
homemakers: Germany, Japan, Great Britain, Sweden, Canada and France. Note, however, that
most of these programs are not true earnings sharing, but are instead funded through volun-
tary homemaker contributions. See Watson, supra note 61, at 14. Implementation of an earn-
ings sharing would encourage re-valuation of the work of childrearing because it would make
the social security accounts of men and women who do care for children portable and per-
sonally owned in the same way that breadwinners' accounts have always been. A homemaker
under current law is only entitled to social security benefits as a dependent of the breadwin-
ner. Under the earnings sharing plan, the homemakers work is considered work and compen-
sated as such. The earnings sharing plan is also limited, however, in that it attempts to re-
value the work of childrearing without challenging the assumption that children are always
reared in a traditional family where there is a full-time homemaker and a full-time breadwin-
ner. The proposal does not address the existence of parents who desire, or necessarily must,
make a concurrent commitment to family and work, with or without the presence of a
spouse.
63. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 10.
64. See Siegel, supra note 60, at 1075 n.3 (noting that "[tihe material consequence of [the]
theoretical undervaluation of women's values in the material world is that women are eco-
nomically impoverished .... [n]urturant, intimate labor is neither valued by liberal legalism
nor compensated by the market economy. . . . [i]t is not compensated in the home and it is
not compensated in the workplace. , citing Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHi. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1988)).
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norms is a well-founded principle, and one that must be considered in the
context of addressing gender inequities in employment.'
Women's lower earning potential in the United States is strongly related
to the typical role women fill in the family. Assumption of a caretaker role
in turn adversely affects women's ability to commit to work outside the
home: because women have the biological responsibility to bear children and
the socially constructed responsibility to care for those children, they have an
additional burden in the paid labor market. Despite the social imposition of
this additional burden, until 1993 there was no national policy allowing a
woman to take a leave of absence from her job to address her responsibili-
ties in the family. There is still no guaranteed right to health insurance, nor
any requirement that she be paid any portion of her wage lost because she
is not working due to pregnancy or childbirth.' Leaving a job to bear a
65. See, e.g. Philip Selznick, Legal Institutions and Social Controls, 17 VAND. L. REV. 79
(1963); Leo Kanowitz, Women and The Law: A Reply to Some of the Commentators, 4 FAM. L. Q.
19 (1970).
66. Indeed, a health care system wherein health insurance is generally a benefit received
as a part of one's employment compensation places many women in a Catch-22 situation:
typically, a woman must either be employed (or married to a man that is) in order to receive
health insurance. Yet the lack of structural support allowing her to simultaneously be em-
ployed and attend to her caretaker responsibilities places her at risk of losing both her em-
ployment and her health insurance. She is insulated from such risk only if she bears her
children while married to an employed man with whom she cohabits. Although the argument
is made that such a system is necessary in order to preserve the eroding "Family Values" of
our nation, the fact is that women in America must be free to choose when and where they
will work-inside or outside the home. The Draconian imposition of such penalties for behav-
ior outside of a single, legislatively supported "Family Values" approved choice-childbearing
only in the context of marriage to an employed man with deference given to his career at the
expense of hers-synergistically combined with prescribed, restrictive gender roles, serves to
deny individual autonomy, further devalue women and their contributions to society, and to
insure perpetuation of the pay gap.
The current focus of welfare reform debate is particularly illustrative of our cultural
tendency to view childrearing as the private folly of individual parents rather than as a so-
cially useful occupation. See, e.g., Crossfire: All in the Family (Cable News Network television
broadcast, Aug. 19, 1992) (comments of Mike Kinsley, John Sununu, Reverend Jerry Falwell,
and Reverend Joseph Lowrey). Although I do not mean to condone a practice of welfare
dependency or to advocate a policy that discourages honest work and contribution to society
by offering hand-outs, I do strongly take issue with a notion that raising children--even in
low-income situations-is not honest work that contributes to society. Such a notion clearly
indicates a devaluation of the nurturant work of childrearing and the women who typically
perform it. See, e.g., Clarence Page, Family Values? Oh, Never Mind, CHICAGO TRIB. 3 (Sept. 13,
1992) (noting the contradiction of the "Bush-Quayle Family Values" stance-working mothers,
like Murphy Brown, should stay home, but welfare mothers should get out of the home to
work-it's only after . . . mothers find work that Bush and Quayle want them to stay
home"). See also Editorial, Looking Ahead: Our Hopes for 1994, ARIZONA REPUBLIC C4 (Jan. 2,
1994) (noting that "[a]ny [welfare] reform must be carefully considered. . . . [bJefore single
mothers are required to work, good, inexpensive day care options must be made available. .
• . [b]efore laws are passed that are unduly punitive to single parents, a good deal of though
must be given to the societal ills that result when women remained with abusive men");
Editorial, Legal System Places Unfair Burden on Dads, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH 3B (Nov. 24,
1992) (correctly characterizing "workfare reform" as a program where "welfare mothers serve
double-duty as 'mothers' and breadwinner, and children are raised by no parents instead of
one" despite author's overall assertion that traditional two-parent families are the only accept-
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child is not considered good cause for the purpose of determining eligibility
for receipt of unemployment insurance."7 The historical lack of a legal man-
date and the shortcomings of the current directive' demonstrate the low
priority public policy places on women and their participation in the labor
force.'
Aside from its economic consequences for women, the historical lack of
federal policy on maternity and parental leave poses an interesting paradox.
Although the family is touted as an all-American institution deserving of
protection at all costs, there is no provision for a comprehensive family poli-
cy in our country. As discussed in Sections Two and Three, there is no sys-
able ones and that society "suffers from deadbeat attorneys.... [and] deadbeat feminists who
have won the benefits of marriage without needing a husband").
67. See Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (holding
that application of a Missouri statute which disqualified unemployment claimants who left
"work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his employer" to deny
unemployment compensation to a woman who terminated employment because of her preg-
nancy because the Congressional intent had been merely to prohibit States from singling
out pregnancy for unfavorable treatment and not to mandate preferential treatment). For a
critique of Wimberly and the policy embodied therein, see Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Be-
yond: Analyzing the Refusal to Award Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior
Employment Due to Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532 (1988) (arguing that, given the ambiguous
legislative history and other Supreme Court precedent in the area of employment compensa-
tion, the Court in Wimberly could just as easily have held that §3304(a)(12) of the FUTA re-
quires preferential treatment to pregnant and formerly pregnant women). Radford further
argues that, given the current realities that women with children are a major component of
the workforce and that women generally have no guarantee of job reinstatement when they
try to return to work, women should not be disqualified from receiving unemployment bene-
fits, not should they be presumed ineligible for benefits merely because they were or current-
ly are pregnant. Disqualifying pregnant or formerly pregnant women from receiving unem-
ployment benefits, or presuming them ineligible for such benefits, forces them to make a dif-
ficult decision between having income and having children. Granting pregnant or formerly
pregnant women special treatment in the context of unemployment insurance will further the
goal of allowing a concurrent commitment to work and family. Id. at 606-08.
68. See J.W. Waks & C.R. Brewster, Family Leave Coverage is Overestimated, NAT'L L. J. 20,
27-28 (May 3, 1993).
69. The low value placed on women's work in the paid labor market is pointedly dem-
onstrated when a comparison is made between the historical lack of legal mandate to support
women who miss work because of pregnancy and the multitude of proposals made in Con-
gress to help the returning veterans of the 1991 Gulf War. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson, Outpouring
of Scholarships and Jobs Await Returning Troops After the Ticker Tape, N. Y. TIMES 3 (March 9,
1991). Those veterans who missed work were legally guaranteed a job when they return,
eligible for government sponsored assistance, subsidized in educational pursuits to allow them
the opportunity to advance to a higher position in the labor market, and compensated for
their absence from work. Id. Women who miss work to bear children are guaranteed none of
the above privileges. While the argument can be made that the veterans are entitled to privi-
leges and benefits because they missed work in the course of defending our country, a simi-
lar argument can be made on behalf of women who miss work to bear children. If women
did not continue to bear children, eventually there 'would be no country to defend. Women's
work of bearing children is even more valuable to the future of our country than any
veteran's, yet our government does not value the contribution of women to society enough to
recognize it by making provisions for women to bear children without penalty in the job
market.
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tern of acceptable childcare, and simultaneous parental and career commit-
ments are impossible for the majority of today's citizens. Professional
childcare, a job created by the mass movement of women into the workforce
and performed most often by women, is one of the lowest paying jobs in
this country7°-truck drivers, who are overwhelmingly male,7 earn almost
three times as much.' These cultural priorities would seem to indicate a
low valuation of children, family, women, and their work.
Ii. A SURVEY OF CURRENT PUBLIC POLICY ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS GENDER
INEQUITIES IN EMPLOYMENT
Gender inequities in employment have been addressed on several
fronts-among the most notable legislative provisions are the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993,"3 the Equal Pay Act of 1963,' 4 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,76 and
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment has also been used as a tool to challenge laws and poli-
cies that discriminate against women, and to define a constitutional mini-
mum to which the law must adhere with respect to gender equity in em-
ployment.78
A. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (the "FMLA") is the most
recent Congressional attempt to address gender inequities in employment
and maintenance of the family in contemporary society, and the first attempt
to articulate a national family leave standard.' The FMLA provides that
70. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 426, Table No. 671. In addition to
being poorly compensated, childcare is also often dangerous. See, e.g., Joanne Lipman, The
Nanny Trap: Dark Side of Child Care is How Poorly Workers Are Sometimes Treated, WALL ST. J.
Al, 6 (April 14, 1993).
71. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 405-07, 407, Table No. 644.
72. See id. at 426, Table No. 671.
73. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 103, 107-11 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 104, 111-34 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 105, 119-20, 136-40 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 106, 124-30 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
79. 29 U.S.C.A. §§2601, 2611-19, 2631-36, 2651-54 (Supp. 1994). See generally Maureen
Porette & Brian Gunn, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: The Time Has Finally Come for
Governmental Recognition of True "Family Values", 8 ST. JOHN'S J. L. COMM. 587 (1994); G. John
Tysse & Kimberly L. Japinga, The Federal Family and Medical Leave Act: Easily Conceived, Diffi-
cult Birth, Enigmatic Child, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361 (1994).
The Act opens with an articulation of its findings and purposes:
(a) Findings
Congress finds that-
(1) the number of single-parent households and two-parent households in
which the single parent or both parents work is increasing significantly;
(2) it is important for the development of children and the family unit that
fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing and the care of fami-
ly members who have serious health conditions;
Volume 1:119 1994
ARE WOMEN WORTH As MUCH As MEN? 139
employers with more than fifty employees in a 75 mile radius are required
to offer workers as much as twelve weeks of unpaid leave after childbirth or
adoption, to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or parent, or in the case of
an employee's own serious illness.' Employers must continue health-care
coverage during the leave,"' and guarantee reinstatement to the same or a
comparable position. 2 Employers may, however, exempt from coverage
their "key" employees, defined as their highest-paid ten percent whose leave
would cause economic harm to the employer,' as well as any employee
who has not worked at least 1,250 hours for the employer in the last year.'
An employer may also substitute an employee's accrued paid leave for any
part of the mandated twelve week periodSS-with the exception that an em-
ployee may not be forced to use sick leave as part of the twelve weeks
required for childbirth or adoption.' Employers may require employees to
provide thirty days notice for foreseeable leaves for birth, adoption, or
planned medical treatment," and require an employee taking intermittent
leave for planned medical treatments to transfer temporarily to an equivalent
alternative position' and provide medical certification including expected
dates of treatment and the planned duration thereof." Provisions designed
to discourage abuse include an employer's right to require two doctors'
certifications of a serious illness."
The FMLA is the first national family leave legislation; state legislatures
have addressed the issue, but provisions have been far from uniform or
complete.9' A 1989 Employee Benefits Survey found that prior to implemen-
(3) the lack of employment policies to accommodate working parents can force
individuals to choose between job security and parenting;
(4) there is inadequate job security for employees who have serious health
conditions that prevent them from working for temporary periods;
(5) due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our society, the pri-
mary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and such responsibil-
ity affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working lives of
men; and
(6) employment standards that apply to one gender only have serious potential
for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees and applicants for
employment who are of that gender.
(b) Purposes
It is the purpose of this Act-
(1) to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national
interests in preserving family integrity; ...
29 U.S.C.A. §2601.
80. Id. §2612.
81. Id. §2614(c)(1).
82. Id. §2614(a)(1).
83. Id. §2614(b).
84. Id. §2611(2)(A).
85. Id. §2612(d)(2)(A).
86. Id. §2612(d)(2)(B).
87. Id. §2612(e)(1)-(2).
88. Id. §2612(b)(2).
89. Id. §2613(b).
90. Id. §2613(c).
91. Most states provide some form of parental or medical leave independent from that
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tation of the national FMLA, only 37 percent of employees were covered by
any maternity or paternity leave provisions.92
Arguments against the concept of a mandated family leave focus on the
desirability of a world view of employer independence wherein regulation
would unacceptably compromise competitiveness and flexibility.93 In this
scheme, complete reliance on the free market to determine award of employ-
ee benefits will achieve the optimally efficient market. The belief is that
government infringements upon management prerogative without reference
to supply and demand principles pose undue burdens upon individual em-
ployers that hurt our economy as a whole. Major concerns of the anti-leave
lobby include claims that small businesses unable to interchange employees
during leave periods will be particularly burdened, 4 and that employers
may be forced to hold positions open and maintain provision of benefits for
employees who have no intention of returning to the workforce. 9' Yet de-
granted by the FMLA, although the scope of requirements varies greatly. See Deirdre A.
Whittaker, In the Conservative Era of the 1980's: Should We Have a National Leave Policy: A Sur-
vey of Leave Policies, Problems and Solutions, 34 How. L. J. 411 (1991); HELEN D. IRVIN & RALPH
M. SILBERMAN, FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVES: THE NEW FEDERAL STATUTE AND STATE LAWS 35-
47 (1993). Note that the FMLA does not supersede any provision of state or local
law-including both existing laws and those that might be enacted in the future-that pro-
vides greater family or medical leave than the Act provides. Id. at 35. The following jurisdic-
tions offer pregnancy disability leave: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dis-
trict of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Is-
land, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 36-47. Length of leaves varies from six
weeks to 'a reasonable period'. Id. Not all states address the issue of maintaining benefits:
some provide that maintenance must be the same as for other disabled workers, some pro-
vide that only health insurance is to be maintained, and some provide further that the full
cost of maintained benefits are to be paid for by the employee. Id. Coverage varies from
including employers with 25 or more employees to requiring a minimum of one hundred
employees: Id. The following jurisdictions go beyond simple pregnancy disability to offer fami-
ly leave for birth, adoption, or care of a sick child: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
92. 136 CONG. REC. S8006-01, 8007 (1990) (statements of Sen. Burns). See U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 431, Table No. 679 (indicating that, in 1991, of full-time em-
ployees at medium and large private establishments, two percent of employees had paid ma-
ternity leave available to them, one percent had paid paternity leave available, 37 percent had
unpaid maternity leave available, and 26 percent had unpaid paternity leave available).
93. See, e.g., H. R. REP., No. 103-8, 103d Sess., pt. 2 (1993) (Republican Committee
Amendments to H.R. 1, The Family and Medical Leave Act) (noting particularly the paucity
of state provisions as an indication that the legislation is undesirable).
94. But note that the FMLA exempts employers with fewer than fifty employees in a 75
mile radius. 29 U.S.C.A. §2611(2)(B)(ii).
95. An employer's obligation to provide benefits under the FMLA ends when it becomes
"known that an employee is not returning to employment and therefore ceases to be entitled
to leave under this Act." Id. §2614(c)(2). This concern was addressed in another manner by
the Rhode Island legislature-a Rhode Island employee taking his allotted unpaid leave pays
the employer a sum equal to the premium of the maintained benefits prior to commencing
the leave. The employer then refunds the payment upon the employee's return to work. R.I.
GEN. LAWS §28-48-3(c) (1990).
The concern articulated, however, should properly be viewed in the context of re-defin-
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spite the concerns of the business lobby, a recent Wall Street Journal survey
indicates that most small businesses are ready to comply with the FMLA,
and do not anticipate any new burdens or more than a nominal implementa-
tion cost.' Responding employers indicated that they have already managed
to fill vacancies left by workers on leave by simply transferring existing per-
sonnel, hiring temporary workers, or allowing job-sharing arrangements.97
The cost of implementation of a mandated family leave law has been an-
other issue to which conservatives opposed to interference with business
have clung. Currently, however, taxpayers are assessed almost $5 billion
each year as a direct result of denial of job-protected parental or medical
leave.98 Even putting fairness concerns aside, it is more cost-effective for
employers to permit employees to return to their original jobs than for the
employers to hire and train new employees; it is similarly more cost-effective
for our economy as a whole to accommodate the needs of parents and fami-
lies in a proactive manner, rather than intervening in a crisis situation by
paying unnecessary unemployment insurance and welfare to parents who
would be willing to work if given the opportunity.
One argument proffered by the anti-family leave camp holds that the
imposition of mandatory family leave will actually hurt women in the
workplace insofar as employers, aware of the cultural reality that women
tend to care for children and dependents more often than do men, will then
consider the cost of providing leave in making employment decisions, and
will decline to employ women. There are several flaws in this argument,
including the fact that such a decision by an employer would constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex that is already clearly illegal under Title
VII. The most insidious flaw, however, is that the argument is self-fulfilling.
Family leave is a gender-neutral concept; its purpose is to strengthen the
valuation of family in our country by allowing all willing parents the oppor-
tunity to make family commitments. Passage of the FMLA allows men the
option to take time to care for children without penalty that most fathers
would not otherwise have. Although cultural taboos against men taking
paternity leave still exist, the FMLA is one step towards changing public
perception of appropriate gender roles and valuation of the family.
As the foregoing discussion indicates, arguments against a national
family leave policy crumble unless one accepts the premise that traditional
gender roles are desirable. Proponents of such a view point to the halcyon
ing the valuation of family in our country. If we view the act of childrearing as one per-
formed by parents for the benefit of society, instead of as a private folly, then the possibility
that an employer will have to comply with leave and benefit maintenance for twelve weeks
without a guarantee of future labor by that employee, is a small contribution by businesses to
the cultural good of creating a generation of cared for children.
96. Timothy L. O'Brien, Udayan Gupta, & Barbara Marsh, Most Small Businesses Appear
Prepared to Cope With New Family-Leave Rules, WALL ST. J. B1 (Feb. 8, 1993).
97. Id. But see Dawn Gunsch, The Family Leave Act: A Financial Burden? Vol. 72, No. 9
PERSONNEL J. 48 (1993) (offering anecdotal evidence of the cost of implementation to employ-
ers).
98. See, e.g., H. R. REP., No. 103-8, 103d Sess., pt. 2 (1993) (supplemental views of Rep.
Morella).
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1950s when women stayed home and worked full-time to take care of house-
hold, children, and husband. The argument then follows that current prob-
lems in the family are the result of women abandoning their domestic com-
mitments in favor of entering the labor market. Within this framework, the
idea that these working women should receive the benefit of government-
mandated support to enable abandonment of their domestic responsibilities
is repugnant. But women are in the workplace to stay. Ignoring the need for
family support systems will not change demographic reality-it will merely
penalize our children for the perceived sins of their mothers. Parenting
should be a gender neutral commitment, and recognition of that fact in our
public policies is long overdue.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROHIBITED GENDER INEQUITIES IN EMPLOYMENT
The FMLA is the most recent national legislation relevant to gender
inequities in employment, but it is only one part of the landscape of existing
public policy. Before discussing the other elements of federal policy, howev-
er, an examination of relevant constitutional issues is helpful. The Equal
Protection Clause has been used in several different contexts to overturn
laws, policies, and practices based on the assumption that women are finan
cially dependent on men.' The possibility that a man might be financially
99. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding invalid a policy which auto-
matically qualified male service personnel for spousal benefits, but required a female person-
nel member to show proof that her spouse was financially dependent upon her income before
she was eligible for the same benefits). The premise of the policy in Frontiero was that, be-
cause the incidence of husband-dependence was so low and the incidence of wife-dependence
was so high, it was administratively simpler to qualify automatically the male personnel for
spousal benefits, while simultaneously refraining from giving unnecessary benefits to the prob-
ably non-dependent husbands of female personnel. In finding the Frontiero policy unconstitu-
tional, the Court disallowed a rationale of administrative convenience to justify gender dis-
crimination-in order to be a permissible policy, a law had to either require that all person-
nel prove spousal dependence before receiving benefit eligibility, or it had to automatically
qualify all personnel regardless of gender-based statistical likelihoods. Other cases include:
Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a provision of the
Social Security Act which provided payment of death benefits to widows and their children,
but in the case of a woman's death, only to her children); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(finding unconstitutional an Alabama law which stated that husbands were liable to pay ali-
mony, but wives were not); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (finding unconstitutional
a portion of the Social Security Act which provided for benefits to needy children in the case
of the father's unemployment, but not in the case of the mother's); Wengler v. Druggists
Mutual Insurance Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (finding unconstitutional a clause in Missouri's
workmen's compensation laws which required a husband to prove dependence on his wife's
earnings in order to gain eligibility for compensation if his wife was injured on the job, but
gave a wife automatic eligibility if her husband was injured); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977) (finding unconstitutional a rule that automatically qualified widows for old-age
survivor benefits but required widowers to show dependency to be eligible). But see Heckler
v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (finding constitutional a transitional rule enacted in response
to Goldfarb under which widows were automatically qualified for old-age survivor benefits but
husbands had to show dependence because the motivation for the rule was to protect reliance
on earlier sex-based provisions).
The decisions in these cases are important in the realm of gender discrimination because
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dependent on a woman historically has been treated as so improbable that
laws were often designed in ways that made it a difficult situation to verify.
The legal assumption that a woman is financially supported by a man rein-
forced the popular belief that what a man earned was therefore inherently
more important than what a woman earned, which rationalized the fact that
women were paid less than men, often for equal work.
The Equal Protection Clause has been useful in combatting gender dis-
crimination, but it is important to note that its reach is limited. Gender is
not seen by the Court as a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny.1°°
they challenge the legal viability of the widespread cultural assumption that women are finan-
cially dependent on men and that the reverse is almost never true. It is also important to
note, however, that although the legal viability of this assumption has been successfully chal-
lenged, the cultural underpinnings are still strong. Further, while these case may make strong
rhetorical statements about financial discrimination against women, the laws that were actually
struck down had very little practical effect. See Becker, supra note 61, at 274. And although
the law can no longer support direct classifications based on gender, it remains legally accept-
able to prefer persons performing cultural roles typically assigned to men at the expense of
persons performing roles typically assigned to women. For example, see supra note 66, discuss-
ing the divergent treatment of homemakers versus breadwinners in our Social Security laws.
Cultural assumptions are less easily shaken than are legal policies and procedures, and are
more damaging to the earning potential and status of women in society.
It is also important to note that there have been several Supreme Court cases that have
upheld policies based on the presumption that a man earns the primary income in a family
rather than the woman on the theory that such classifications are often motivated by a legis-
lative desire to compensate women for past discrimination. Such an analysis, however, as-
sumes that discrimination against women is no longer a current concern, and weakens efforts
to combat the problem at its roots. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (finding constitu-
tional a Florida law granting widows, but not widowers, a $500 property tax exemption as a
benign distinction because the death of a husband generally imposes a greater financial loss
than does the death of a wife); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (finding constitutional
a provision in the Social Security Act which allowed wives, but not husbands, to exclude
three or more of their lower earning years in computing average wage for retirement benefits
as a benign, logical response to the problem of gender inequities in employment and the
lower earning potential of women); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (finding consti-
tutional a Federal law on mandatory Navy discharges that guaranteed women thirteen years
of service but provided that men are automatically discharged after failing twice to be pro-
moted as a rational response to the fact that women are likely to be given fewer opportuni-
ties to be promoted than are men). Decisions such as these that allow stop-gap measures tend
to work against the possibility of achieving true solutions, and instead effectively condone the
roots of the problem by myopically addressing only the symptoms.
Statistical justifications for financially disparate treatment of women have also been de-
clared unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. See City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Water v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (finding unconstitutional a pension plan that required
female employees to pay fifteen percent more into the pension fund than male employees
despite statistical evidence demonstrating that, on average, women live longer than men, so
the average woman is therefore likely to collect more payments from the fund than is the
average man; and noting that "[e]mployment decisions cannot be predicated on mere
'stereotypes' about the characteristics of males or females"). The Court later extended the
Manhart principle to private employers covered by Title VII. See Arizona v. Norris, 464 U.S.
808 (1983) (finding invalid under Title VII a pension plan that made lower payments to wom-
en after retirement than to men who had made equal contributions).
100. Gender classifications are currently seen as quasi-suspect, thus warranting heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause-in order for a classification that treats women
differently than men to survive a constitutional challenge, there must be an important govern-
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In 1923, immediately following passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment-which guaranteed to women the right to vote-an Equal Rights
Amendment (the "ERA") was originally proposed in Congress. Passage and
ratification of the ERA would have constitutionally guaranteed to women the
same rights that have been guaranteed to men throughout the history of our
government. 1 ' The argument has been made that the ERA is not necessary
to guarantee the equal rights of women in America because the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is sufficient. But although the Equal Protection Clause may
have the potential to be a sufficient constitutional base on which to guaran-
tee the equal rights of women, the fact remains that gender discriminatory
laws were the norm until the 1970s, and the Supreme Court has still not yet
accorded gender sufficient status to make all discriminatory laws unconstitu-
tional. The failure of our Supreme Court to make gender a suspect classifica-
tion warranting strict scrutiny and the lack of popular support needed to
adopt the ERA demonstrate that women still face a biased situation in the
United States.
C. FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION POLICY: TITLE VII AND ITS COM-
PLEMENTS
Employers, labor organizations, and employment agencies are immune
to attack on substantive due process or equal protection grounds because
those constitutional safeguards are directed at governmental, not private,
actors. Prior to 1960, there was no judicial recourse for most discriminatory
employment practices. Discrimination in employment has, however, been ad-
dressed legislatively on both state and federal levels in the last three de-
mental objective at stake, and the classification must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of that important objective. The Supreme Court has not granted gender the status of a
suspect class, and in fact did not even consider gender a quasi-suspect classification until
1976. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Suspect classifications-race and legitimacy-are
subjected to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In order to survive strict scruti-
ny, a classification must serve a compelling government objective, and must be necessary to
the achievement thereof. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
357 (1978). The most plausible argument justifying the failure to accord gender the status of
suspect is based on the historical fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed with race
in mind, and not gender. But see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (extending strict
scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause to include classifications of Asians without
explanation for the expansion). For a historical argument in favor of granting suspect status
to gender classifications, see Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case
for Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & P. 86 (1994). Note
also that direct constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause is limited to dis-
crimination by state action. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 586-93, 621-
87 (11th ed. 1985) (discussing Equal Protection Clause analysis, applicability, and varying
levels of scrutiny).
101. See, e.g., John Galotto, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 508
(1993). The proposed amendment read in relevant part: "Equality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." The
ERA was not passed by Congress, however, until 1972, despite its re-introduction every year
from 1923 through 1972. And although the amendment did receive considerable support from
Congress in 1972, it was never ratified by a sufficient number of states to become law. Id. at
519.
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cades. Unfortunately, though there has been much attention paid to the issue
of discrimination in employment and the lower earnings of women, much of
this attention has been ineffectively aimed at symptoms, rather than at caus-
es. Consequently, gender inequities in employment are still prevalent. There
are two major components that make up the existing federal policy against
employment discrimination on the basis of gender: ° the Equal Pay Act of
19631" and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"° as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978," and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.10
The Equal Pay Act explicitly requires that men and women receive
equal pay for equal work. The specific provisions of the Act, however, nar-
row its remedial effect significantly-in order to qualify as equal work re-
quiring equal pay, a job must require equal skill, effort, responsibility, and
working conditions, including physical working space, hazards, and number
of consecutive hours."n' Comparison of jobs to determine equality can only
occur within a particular business establishment-there is no legal provision
for comparison of jobs by any classification of type, thus sex-segregation by
occupation is outside the scope of the statute. In addition, there are four pay
structures explicitly recognized that will excuse the failure to give equal pay
for equal work: seniority systems, merit systems, systems which measure by
quality or quantity of production, and any system which assigns salary
based on any differential that is not sex.') Furthermore, the plaintiff, rather
than the defendant, bears the burden of proof with respect to the existence
of a disparity in wages paid, despite the fact that such information is clearly
more accessible to the employer than it is to the plaintiff.1" The statute
does, however, allow an award of liquidated damages to a successful
plaintiff, and may be privately enforced without the cumbersome administra-
tive prerequisites imposed upon a private Title VII complainant."
102. Several Executive Orders also embody an anti-discrimination principle, but are ex-
tremely specific in their applicability. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted
in 42 U.S.C. §2000e, at 19-24 (1981).
103. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §206 (1978).
104. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e (1981 & Supp. 1992).
105. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978), incorporated in 42
U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
106. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, incorporated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp.
1992).
107. 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(1); Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 197-204 (1974)
(finding that the legislative history of the statutory term "working conditions" includes physi-
cal surroundings and hazards).
108. Coming Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196. Remember, however, as noted earlier, that
earning potential is far more dependent on cultural associations with feminine and masculine
characteristics than it is on the actual fact of gender. A prohibition against "any system which
assigns salary based on any differential that is not sex", then, cannot effectively address the
portions of the gender pay gap attributable to prescriptive gender roles and the relative valu-
ations of masculine and feminine attributes. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
109. Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 195 (noting that "[a]lthough the Act is silent on this
point, its legislative history makes plain that the Secretary has the burden of proof") (citations
omitted).
110. See JAMES E. JONES, JR., WILLIAM P. MURPHY, & ROBERT BELTON, DISCRIMINATION IN
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Title VII is the broadest anti-discrimination legislation-its key language
provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful ... practice ... to discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. .. ""' The simplicity of the original statutory
scheme indicated a Congressional assessment of discrimination in 1964 as an
important issue and an unacceptable practice, but also as a simple and obvi-
ous occurrence that could be easily remedied."2
In 1971, however, the Supreme Court introduced sweeping judicial
changes to the statute by establishing the concept of disparate impact as a
cognizable cause of action under Title VII.'" Under the disparate impact
theory, a plaintiff could make a prima facie showing of discrimination by
merely pointing to statistics that demonstrated a disparity in hiring, promo-
tions, salaries, or the rate at which other benefits of employment were doled
out by an employer."' The burden then shifted to the employer to articu-
late a legitimate business reason for its decisions."' The plaintiff could re-
but with a showing that the proffered reason was pretextual." 6 The Court
would then be satisfied that, given the demonstrated statistical disparity, and
the absence of sufficient explanation by the employer, that the disparity
must be caused by impermissible discrimination. 17 The concept of disparate
impact and statistical proof allowed plaintiffs to prove a host of subtle dis-
criminatory practices that would not have been actionable under the original
scheme of Title VII due to a lack of direct evidence.
Title VII was amended extensively in 1972,18 and again in 1978,1"
when, among other things, the statute was changed to include pregnancy,
childbirth, and related medical conditions in the terms "because of sex" and
'on the basis of sex."' The essential re-enaction of the statute in 1972 and
the passage of the Pregnancy Disability Act (the "PDA") in 1978 indicated a
new Congressional willingness to delve more deeply to account for the his-
torical differences between gender and race discrimination.
Some of the remedial impact of Title VII was lessened in 1989, however,
when the Court ruled in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio2' that an em-
ployee who alleges that a company's facially neutral practices have a dispa-
rate impact on women, blacks, or other minorities, must identify in his com-
plaint the specific practices that result in the discrimination." Previously, a
EMPLOYMENT 447-464 (5th ed. 1987).
111. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a).
112. See generally Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Dispa-
rate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305 (1983).
113. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
114. Id. at 431.
115. Id. at 432.
116. See id. at 435.
117. See id. at 436.
118. Pub. L. No. 92-261 (1972), incorporated in 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1981 & Supp. 1992).
119. Pregancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978), incorporated in 42
U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
120. Id.
121. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
122. Id. at 657.
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plaintiff's prima facie case only required a showing of statistical dispari-
ty." Although the ultimate burden of persuasion has always rested on the
plaintiff with respect to showing that a statistical disparity is not caused by
legitimate practices, requiring a plaintiff to also fulfill the burden of produc-
tion makes statement of a disparate impact claim extremely burdensome. In-
formation with respect to employment decisions and practices is inherently
within the control of the employer-to require articulation by the plaintiff of
specific practices as a prerequisite to their day in court is to deny many
plaintiffs the opportunity to pursue their claims. The Wards Cove rule seems
also to provide a bizarre incentive to employers to keep sparse records,
communicate with employees and applicants as little as possible, and to
keep hiring policies and criteria secret.
Congress responded to the Court's weakening of Title VII; despite a
veto by President Bush in 1990, a clarifying amendment was successfully
enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1991."2 The provisions contained therein
re-define the allocation of burden in disparate impact cases," prohibit dis-
criminatory adjustment of test scores, 26 limit challenges to judicially af-
firmed affirmative action plans,'27 allow jury trials," specify at what
point time limits begin to run with respect to a challenge to a seniority sys-
tem," and allow tort-like punitive and compensatory damages for inten-
tional discrimination." The policy embodied in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 encourages employers to adopt uniform personnel policies and to keep
careful records of employment decisions and evaluations. Congressional
intent is unarguably to put the teeth back into the prohibition against dis-
crimination in employment and to require affirmative attention to the prob-
lem of institutionalized discrimination from all employers.
1. Application of Title VII to Instances of Gender Inequity in Employment
Title VII has been used as a tool to challenge several policies and laws
which supported the cultural assumption that women have primary respon-
sibility for childrearing. In 1971, for example, the Court declared
impermissibly discriminatory a company policy which refused to hire wom-
en with pre-school aged children because there was no such rule for men
with children of the same age.' This decision represents an important
challenge to institutional reinforcement of the cultural stereotype that the
woman should always have the responsibility of childrearing, and that her
option to enter the working world exists only after that primary obligation
has been fulfilled.
123. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
124. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, incorporated in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e
(Supp. 1992).
125. Id. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
126. Id. §2000e-2(i).
127. Id. §2000e-2(n)(1).
128. Id. §1981a(c)(1).
129. Id. §2000e-5(e).
130. Id. §1981(b)(1).
131. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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Title VII has been used several times in attempts to address sex segre-
gation in employment by seeking judicial approval of the concept of compa-
rable worth, but such attempts have been largely unsuccessful.3 ' But the
Supreme Court has held that, unlike claims brought under the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII claims are not restricted to claims for equal pay for substantial-
ly equal work."n The Court noted that its decision was "not based on the
controversial concept of comparable worth," but that it would be willing to
regard certain explicit inequities between dissimilar jobs as constituting wage
discrimination under Title VII."
2. Responsibility of an Employer to a Pregnant Employee Under Title VIP3
The Pregnancy Disability Act of 1978 (the "PDA") expressly includes
pregnancy within the meaning of sex for determining impermissible discrimi-
nation." While the PDA was well-intentioned and designed to offer wom-
en more protection under Title VII, it belies an apparent Congressional belief
that pregnancy accommodation, much like anti-discrimination as originally
conceived in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, is simple and easily implemented.
The PDA, in mandating equal treatment of pregnant employees, 37 ignores
the reality that pregnancy is a gender difference. While pregnancy is not a
difference that warrants discrimination against women in the workplace, it is
a difference employers must be required to recognize and address."
132. For a discussion of the concept of comparable worth, see infra note 148 and accompa-
nying text.
133. Gunther v. County of Washington, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
134. Id. at 166. In 1983, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employ-
ees sued the State of Washington, claiming wage discrimination by occupation. AFSCME v.
State of Washington, 578 F.Supp. 846 (1983). The first court to hear the case found for the
plaintiffs and issued a decision advocating a broad application of the Title VII prohibition on
gender discrimination in employment. Id. at 856. Had the lower court decision been upheld, it
would have essentially mandated a standard of comparable worth. In 1985, however, the
Ninth Circuit overruled the decision, stating that the free market cannot be held a suspect
enterprise. 770 F.2d 1401 (1985). Although the court recognized that the plaintiffs had indeed
demonstrated a differential in wages between occupations that corresponded with gender, the
majority held that, as a matter of law, the differential could not be based on discrimination
but was the result of the demands of the free market. Id. at 1407.
135. As discussed supra, at notes 79-98 and accompanying text, the newly enacted FMLA
changes the legal responsibility of an employer to a pregnant worker insofar as it requires
provision of unpaid family leave to both new mothers and fathers. But the scope of the
FMLA goes beyond the issue of actual pregnancy disability-this section specifically addresses
the employment rights of pregnant workers under Title VII.
136. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978), incorporated in 42
U.S.C. §2000e(k) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
137. But see California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (arguably al-
lowing a preferential treatment analysis of the PDA).
138. There have been several cases decided with respect to the issue of pregnant workers
and an employer's responsibility in recent years, both before and after passage of the PDA in
1978. Although the court has refrained from articulating anything more than broad directives,
a fairly coherent scheme has emerged. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977);
Guerra, 479 U.S. at 272. Geduldig addressed California's policy on disability insurance pay-
ments to private employees not covered by workmen's compensation. The policy excluded
benefits for pregnancy, among other named disabilities, and was upheld by the Court as a
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A mere equal treatment mandate fails in any equitable sense when
applied to pregnancy, because women are at a biological disadvantage in a
culturally created employment situation.39 A lack of willingness to accom-
rational, constitutional choice, because the decision not to insure in the case of normal
pregnancy was not invidiously discriminatory. 417 U.S. at 494. The Court endorsed an equal
treatment theory, noting that:
[t]here is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the
program worked to discriminate against any definable group or class in terms of
the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or class from the program.
There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there
is no risk from which women are protected and men are not.
Id. at 496-97. The opinion goes on to say that a state is not required to cover all possible dis-
abilities-it is simply required not to provide any better coverage as a whole to any aggre-
gate group of eligible employees than it does to any other such group. Id. at 496. Gilbert
extended the Geduldig holding to private employers. See 429 U.S. at 125.
The flaw in the Geduldig-Gilbert equal treatment rationale is apparent if one observes
that the Court has effectively equated pregnancy with conditions such as prostate or breast
cancer-although each condition is gender-specific, Geduldig and Gilbert would allow exclusion
of either as a covered disability as long as the exclusion is not part of a pattern wherein an
employer is consistently excluding only those disabilities specific to one gender while covering
those specific to the other. Yet categorization of pregnancy with catastrophic illness such as
breast or prostate cancer merely because all are gender-specific ignores the essential distinction
that pregnancy serves a socially valuable function. Note, however, that the PDA now requires
employers covered by Title VII to treat pregnancy as a disability. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
Although the Court has upheld the right of an employer not to pay disability to a
pregnant worker, it has also held that pregnancy cannot be, in itself, an excuse for loss of
seniority. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 136 (holding that the loss of accumulated seniority when re-
turning to work after pregnancy was not allowable under Title VII). This decision separated
the responsibility of an employer to treat normal pregnancy as a disability entitling a woman
to benefits-which was not required-from the treatment of pregnancy as an authorized leave
that did not result in penalization by loss of seniority-which was required. In other words,
although the employer has no legal responsibility to aid financially in the case of pregnancy,
pregnancy cannot be used as an excuse to keep women in low prestige, low paying jobs. A
woman's seniority and present position must remain available to her following a pregnancy
leave. Note that the FMLA specifically states that the law in no way compromises the right
of employers to implement more protective policies than those mandated, that employees may
not collectively bargain below the floor set by the FMLA, and that the Act does not super-
sede any State or local law that provides greater family or medical leaves. 29 U.S.C.A. §§
2651-53.
The Court has clearly left it to the legislatures to compose a policy with respect to an
employer's responsibility to pregnant employees. In 1987 the Court announced that, although
legislatures were not required to go beyond an equal treatment theory to accommodate preg-
nant workers, neither were they prohibited from doing so. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 272 (up-
holding a California law requiring employers to grant up to four months of unpaid leave to
women disabled by pregnancy and childbirth, even if similar leaves were not granted for
other disabilities because the law "merely establishes benefits that employers must, at a mini-
mum, provide to pregnant workers"). But cf Stephen Keyes, Note: Affirmative Action for Work-
ing Mothers: Does Guerra's Preferential Treatment Rationale Extend to Childrearing Leave Benefits?,
60 FORDHAM L. REv. 309, 322-23 (1991) (arguing that Guerra effectively mandates discrimina-
tion against men by allowing preferential treatment of pregnant women and implying that all
parental leave policies are discriminatory because the reality is that women care for children,
so even a gender-neutral policy would discriminate in practice by allowing women leave from
work without having to demonstrate medically documented disability).
139. For further discussion of the equal versus special treatment debate, see generally Kath-
arine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & P. 1, 3, 4-5 (1994); Marjorie Jacobson,
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modate pregnant workers shows a clear lack of an appropriate societal valu-
ation of both the work of childbearing and rearing, and the presence of
women in the workforce. 4 ' An equitable system will be one wherein two
things are true: first, the work of childbearing and rearing is valued enough
that employers will accommodate this social contribution by women without
imposing career penalties; and second, that women themselves are also rec-
ognized as possessing useful talents outside the reproductive and caretaking
arena such that employers are willing to make accommodations.
III. WHERE No LEGISLATURE HAS GONE BEFORE: A SURVEY OF
INADEQUATELY ADDRESSED GENDER EQUITY ISSUES
Although some legislation currently exists, and courts have made some
pronouncements helpful to ending gender inequities in employment, an
effective solution will require a comprehensive scheme based on altered
cultural assumptions about the value of women, men, children, and family.
The foundations for combating overt sex discrimination in the workplace
have been adequately established on a national basis. The problem lies in the
existing definition of discrimination-it is far too narrow for any further
significant change to occur. The next step is to re-define and re-value gender
differentiation.
The previous section discussed the federal government's attempts to
regulate pay equity, and the legislative and judicial steps that have been
taken toward remedying gender inequities in employment. But there still re-
mains a large gap between the earning potential, relative status, and relative
power of men and women in the labor market. Although the FMLA is an
important element of a comprehensive policy to address both the needs of
the family and gender inequities in employment, it cannot stand alone. The
Note: Pregnancy and Employment: Three Approaches to Equal Opportunity, 68 B. U. L. REV. 1019
(1988); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex
Differences Into Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699 (1986).
140. The Supreme Court, when called upon to evaluate various legislation with ramifica-
tions as to the meaning of pregnancy in our society, has consistently held an inconsistent
view. Much of this inconsistency can be traced to the historical view that an immoral woman
posed a danger to the well-being of society as a whole. This was the basis of much so-called
protective legislation, and still finds expression in phenomena such as the criminalization of
prostitution, social and legal prejudice against rape victims, and controversies over sex educa-
tion of children and availability and legitimacy of birth control and abortion. The sexuality of
women has long been used to legally suppress women, and pregnancy is inextricably linked
to the existence of that sexuality. The Court has mirrored the struggle apparent in society
between support of women who use their sexuality appropriately-for procreation in mar-
riage-and sanctioning those who use it in other, less wholesome ways.
With respect to the inconsistency of the Court's view, consider the contrast between Mi-
chael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California's statutory rape law that
punishes the man involved but not the woman and noting that the possibility of pregnancy
was enough of a potential punishment for women, and that an additional deterrent to young
women by threat of legal punishment was unnecessary and redundant) and the fact that, in
deciding whether or not there should be mandated maternity leaves, prior to passage of the
PDA, the Court did not view pregnancy as a 'disability'. See supra note 138 and accompany-
ing text.
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Act sufficiently covers the need for short-term leave to deal with intense
family needs, but does not address implementation of a system wherein it is
possible to make a concurrent, ongoing commitment to both family and
work. No legislation has yet addressed the incompatibility of simultaneous
parental and career commitments, the lack of institutional support for fami-
lies, the issue of sex-segregation by occupation, or the relative valuation of
the work traditionally associated with women to work traditionally associat-
ed with men.
A. RE-DEFINING COMMITMENTS TO CAREER AND FAMILY
The options for childcare, maternity leave, and parental leave that cur-
rently exist in this country, are first, inadequate; second, stigmatized to the
point that many people do not take advantage of available opportunities;
and third, still "appropriate" only for women without significant career ambi-
tions.' Parental leave should be equally available to men and women,
with no gender-determined stigma attached. The work of childrearing must
be appropriately valued in our culture so that men and women who wish to
do so are free to without significant penalty. Our system must be restruc-
tured in a manner wherein both men and women are free, if they choose, to
make a concurrent commitment to both family and work.
One of the main reasons there is no comprehensive program providing
for childcare and parental leave in the United States is that the issue
challenges traditional assumptions about the family and appropriate gender
roles.' An argument often articulated is that, due to the potential costs, it
141. See WHO CARES FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN? (Cheryl D. Hayes, John L. Palmer, & Mar-
tha J. Zaslow eds., 1990) (examining childcare in the United States and offering recommen-
dation for improvement of government-directed childcare programs). The conclusions reached
by Hayes, Palmer, and Zaslow were: first, existing childcare is inadequate; second, poor quali-
ty childcare is dangerous; third, childcare is a necessity for the majority of American families;
fourth, arranging childcare is most difficult for low-income families; fifth, childcare policy at a
government level needs to be cohesive and directed; sixth, there should be a comprehensive
array of options so that the needs of different people can be adequately met; and finally,
responsibility for childcare should be shared by families, employers, and government. Id. at
xii-xiii. Based on these conclusions, several recommendations were made. The state and feder-
al government should make investments to strengthen the infrastructure of the childcare sys-
tem. This would entail expanding the resource and referral services for finding out about
childcare options, improving care-giver training levels and wages, expanding vendor-voucher
programs, encouraging organization of family day care systems and improving the planning
and coordination of childcare programs. Additionally, the federal government should develop
national standards for childcare, in areas such as staff-to-child ratios, group sizes, training and
experience of care-givers and the physical space and facilities of childcare centers. The final
recommendation was that the federal government should mandate unpaid, job-protected leave
for employed parents of infants up to one year of age. Id. at xiii-xvii.
A recent survey of professional women found that 85, 91, 90, and 55 percent respective-
ly thought that reducing work hours, refusing to work evenings or weekends, refusing to
travel, or missing work due to a child's illness would adversely affect a woman's career.
DEBORAH SWISS & JUDITH WALKER, WOMEN AND THE WORK/FAMILY DILEMMA 24041 (1993).
142. See SWISS & WALKER, supra note 141, at 221; AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 10. A recent
poll found that fully 62 percent of 1,502 randomly selected adults across the county believe
that passing tax incentives to help mothers of young children stay in the home and not work
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is not fair to expect employers to provide programs for childcare and paren-
tal leave. But there have been attempts made by individual employers to
provide programs for their employees.' Studies indicate that family-
friendly policies are actually cost-beneficial to employers because any costs
incurred are more than offset by the savings realized from lower turnover,
higher productivity, and reduced the costs for training new employees.'"
The United States is the last industrialized nation without a national
parental leave policy. Most countries provide for compensation of a parent
on leave and provide a guarantee of reinstatement upon return; many pro-
vide for the use of a social welfare insurance scheme, either as a substitute
for, or in addition to the employer's contribution, to alleviate the cost to
individual employers."5 The key difference between the United States and
would be an effective government action to strengthen the family. Gerald F. Seib, Americans
Feel Families and Values Are Eroding But They Disagree Over the Causes and Solutions, WALL ST.
J. A12 Uune 11, 1993). The current demographic reality is that both mothers and fathers are
working outside the home. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 400, Table Nos.
633, 634. Female-headed households are significantly more likely to be living below the pover-
ty level. See id. at 473, Table No. 745. But see Alecia Swasy, Status Symbols: Stay-at-Home Moms
Are Fashionable Again in Many Communities, WALL ST. J. Al (July 23, 1993).
Private provision of childcare and parental leave is usually presented as addressing a
'women's issue'. See, e.g., Carol Lawson, Like Growing Number of Companies, I.B.M. is Building
Childcare Centers, N. Y. TIMES A20 (Dec. 12, 1990) (quoting an I.B.M. spokesman at the press
conference to announce the company's intention to build new childcare centers as saying that
"childcare had become a vital program to keep women in the work force).
A further problem is that private industry's commitment to childcare and parental leave
programs is necessarily questionable. A noted child psychologist at Yale University was quot-
ed in the same article as commenting that, while I.B.M. is to be commended for its efforts,
"such corporate initiatives are not the solution to the lack of adequate childcare in the United
States." Id. (statements of Dr. Edward F. Zigler). Dr. Zigler went on to pose the vital ques-
tion, "What will happen when a company falls on hard times? It will close a childcare center,
not an assembly plant." Id. The implications are clear-while large corporations can afford to
create their own childcare programs, most companies cannot. Without a clear federal policy,
employers will lack the incentive to spend the money to provide childcare and parental leave
options for their employees. Without federal funds to support the establishment of a childcare
and parental leave system, many parents will find that available options are prohibitively
expensive.
143. See, e.g., Jaclyn Fierman, Are Companies Less Family-Friendly?, FORTUNE 64 (Mar. 21,
1994) (commenting that, although a majority of companies offer some form of childcare sup-
port, referral service, or flexible scheduling to their employees, "good luck finding companies
where use of these programs is either widespread or wholeheartedly embraced by manage-
ment. . . .[tihere are penalties for using these policies"). See also Lisa Jenner, Family-Friendly
Backlash, Vol. 83, No. 5 MGMT. REV. 7 (1994) (discussing new lobbying groups that work on
behalf of non-parent workers who feel discriminated against and assert that "[it's not
business' place to put a value on parenting").
144. See, e.g., Liza Donaldson, Nurturing the Bottom Line-It Makes Good Business Sense to be
a Family-Friendly Employer, FIN. TIMES 11 (April 11, 1994); Fierman, supra note 144.
145. See Patricia Shiu, Work and Family: Policies for the Working Poor, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
349, 350 n.5, 355-56 (1989). West Germany provides fourteen weeks of job-guaranteed leave,
with an additional four weeks in case of premature or multiple birth. A woman is entitled to
one hundred percent of her wages while on leave, and a monthly allowance of approximately
$207 during the extended leave period. France offers sixteen weeks of paid, job-guaranteed
leave, with a possible additional two weeks in the case of multiple birth, and the option of
two years of unpaid leave with priority for reinstatement for one year following the leave.
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other industrialized nations is the relative valuations of work and fami-
ly-our children are seen as a parent's private folly, and parents are expect-
ed to rear their children in spite of their other obligations.
B. VALUING WOMEN AND THEIR WORK: RE-THINKING GENDER IDEOLOGY IN
PUBLIC POLICY
Comparable worth has been proposed to remedy the problems experi-
enced in trying to implement equal pay for equal work. The theory is that a
job that is different is not necessarily inferior or superior, and there should
be a system whereby jobs are rated according to different characteristics and
assigned point values; the point value of a given job can then be translated
into a salary, the range of which would be regulated by legislation." One
of the notable limitations of the comparable worth proposal is that it does
not directly address the issue of occupational sex-segregation in our econo-
my-it is instead an attempt to gain higher wages for female sex-segregated
occupations.
The comparable worth concept has been criticized on several grounds.
Critics claim that the free market will be disrupted; that the costs of imple-
mentation will be exorbitant; that employers will find women too expensive
to hire-thus women will ultimately be hurt not helped by the implementa-
tion of the comparable worth; that equalizing pay for women's jobs will
discourage women from seeking true equality with men in jobs traditionally
considered male occupations; that the assignment of points to a job is neces-
sarily arbitrary because there is no inherent value to jobs that can be mea-
sured-jobs are worth what they can command in the free market and com-
parable worth interferes with the workings of that market; and that, because
part of the wage gap can be attributed to legitimate economic causes, imple-
mentation of comparable worth would be to erroneously assign the entire
wage gap to discrimination. Note that many of these arguments mirror those
The employee receives ninety percent salary from the employer's contribution to maternity
insurance. Italy provides five months job protected pregnancy leave, followed by six months
protected leave for either the mother or the father. Japan provides for a twelve week leave
period, with sixty percent salary paid through social security or insurance with job protection
continuing thirty days past the twelve weeks. Canada provides seventeen weeks of protected
maternity leave and 24 weeks of protected parental leave with sixty percent salary paid
through unemployment insurance. Denmark provides 24 weeks of leave for all new parents
with ninety percent salary. The first three weeks are paid by the employer, the rest by social
security. Sweden has the most extensive policy: a full year of paid parental leave with the
first 180 days at one hundred percent salary. The second 180 days can be taken at any time
until the child is eight years old, and are compensated at ninety percent. Additionally, sixty
days per year until the child reaches age twelve are compensated at ninety percent. Id. at ??.
Note, however, that not all of these countries have gender-neutral policies. While comprehen-
sive maternity leave provisions are indicative of a healthy valuation of the work of
childrearing, the additional aspect of gender neutrality is a necessary component of a policy
that has as its goal eradication of the lower earning potential of women.
146. See generally Hartmann & Aaronson, supra note 1; Carin Ann Clauss, Comparable
Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibility of Its Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 7 (1986).
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made about the FMLA, and in opposition to anti-discrimination legislation
generally.'47
Comparable worth as a policy or a solution is neither complete nor
sufficient. It may be, however, a valid starting point from which to develop
a comprehensive policy that is sufficient, complete, and feasible. The ques-
tion of what the goal in eliminating gender inequities in employment should
be is difficult. We have determined that the cultural assumptions about the
qualities and aptitudes of men and women affect the earning potential of
each gender. Although the characteristics of an aggregate group can be de-
termined, each and every man and woman is an individual. And as an indi-
vidual, each man and each woman possesses some of the qualities that can
be called feminine, and some of the qualities that can be called masculine.
Therefore, to assume that any individual has exactly the same qualities as
the stereotype or average of the group to which he or she belongs is unfair.
Does the aggregate difference between men and women mean that
separate spheres are inherently wrong? One part of the answer lies in the
relative valuations of the different spheres. In our society, the attributes
associated with women, and consequently women themselves and the work
they do, have been devalued. Although perhaps women should not seek to
work in a sphere that is exactly the same as the one in which men work,
fundamental fairness demands that women do have a right to seek a sphere
that is worth as much as that which men have. Every individual should
have the option to seek an experience in a field in which she or he is inter-
ested, regardless of his or her gender.
Men and women as groups are different. They think differently, they
act differently, they dress differently, they communicate differently, and they
relate to others differently. Women should not abandon the feminine quali-
ties that make them women, just as men should not abandon the masculine
qualities that make them men. Women and men should, however, seek to
eliminate the devaluation of feminine qualities in our culture generally, and
our labor market specifically. A woman who wishes to be successful in the
labor market should not have to work towards her goal by emulating men;
a woman should be able to bring her feminine qualities to a job, do the job
well, and be recognized and compensated appropriately for her achievement
and her work, just as a man is. Additionally, because all men and women
are individuals, the restriction of culturally enforced prescriptive gender roles
must be eliminated if we are to allow all men and women to work and earn
according to each person's individual potential and aptitude, rather than
according to an arbitrary valuation based on the biological fact of gender.
The components of a solution to eliminate the lower earning potential of
women must begin with the elimination of restrictive gender roles and the
establishment of an equal valuation of the qualities normally called feminine
and the qualities normally called masculine.
The goals of this proposal are: first, the establishment of institutional
and structural support for families such that concurrent commitments to
147. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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family and career are both possible and acceptable; second, the abandonment
of prescriptive gender roles and expectations; and third, an appropriate in-
crease in our cultural valuation of nurturing work, particularly the work of
childrearing. We must recognize the necessity of preserving the family in
some form, and the need for a social support system which allows children
to grow up in a nurturing, stable environment. It is equally important that
the status of the United States as a world economic power be preserved.
Because not all Americans are the same, the solution to the problem of gen-
der inequities in employment will necessarily involve choices. There must be
several different options, all of which fit the above requirements, so that
men and women can choose whichever childcare solution fits their personal
goals.
The primary component of an effective solution will involve a shift in
the norms and ideals of American society. The assumptions behind our pub-
lic policies play a large part in the perpetuation of stereotypes, and can be
instrumental in providing support for changes in norms. Law and public
policy can facilitate a shift in cultural assumptions: first, by examining and
changing the assumptions upon which existing legislation in all areas is
based; and second, by proactively legislating on issues specifically addressed
to gender inequities.
Proactive legislation would include government-mandated provisions for
non-gender-based childcare for all employed people, and non-gender-specific
parental leaves. There should be a variety of choices-including, but not
limited to, flexible schedules (both in days worked per week and hours
worked per day), days off for childcare, and complete parental leaves for a
specified period of time with job protection for parents of newborn or newly
adopted children. There should be a complete removal of the stigmatization
of gender in the division of labor, and there should be no possibility that
either a woman or a man will be penalized, overtly or subtly, for taking an
"inappropriate" parental leave. The success of such programs will depend on
the cultural acceptance of a change in gender roles. It will be insufficient to
establish programs if the norms and ideals of the culture remain such that
programs will not be utilized fully or effectively, or if those who participate
in them will be penalized. The perpetuation of cultural norms cannot be
ignored if gender inequities in employment are to be eliminated. It is crucial
to the facilitation of a shift in cultural norms for legislators to examine exist-
ing legislation, such as the Social Security system, and to eliminate elements
that have as their basis assumptions about appropriate gender roles, or a
devaluation of the work of childrearing.
Acceptance of non-gender-specific support systems could be encouraged
by providing equal incentives in the form of a family allowance payment
(similar to that offered in many European countries) from a government-
administered insurance fund to men and women who take time off work for
childcare. The act of raising children is necessary to the stability and contin-
uation of our country, and childcare must be valued accordingly. Rather
than viewing time off for childrearing as a privilege parents must work for,
our culture must recognize it as a necessary and valuable service that each
parent provides. Because parents are effectively supporting our country by
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rearing children in stable families, the notion of an allowance payment is
less like a handout, and more like compensation for work performed.
The government should support the option of re-allocation of work and
family time over the life cycle by offering low-interest loans to parents of
young children. This would mean that both parents would sacrifice a portion
of their earning potential while their children are young by working part-
time. Once the children are old enough, both parents would return to work
full-time. To compensate for the elected sacrifice in earning, parents would
continue to work part-time after they reach the normal retirement age. Thus
the overall earnings per family would remain at current levels-there would
simply be a re-distribution of earning levels both over the life cycle and
between husband and wife. The government could support this option by
providing low-interest, federally guaranteed loans to the parents of young
children, similar to the way student loans are currently offered. Other ele-
ments of a comprehensive plan could involve the use of tax credits for both
childcare expenditures and time spent out of the labor market for
childrearing purposes, and payment of unemployment insurance to men and
women who are out of the labor market for childbearing or rearing purpos-
es.
Other possible programs to aid with childcare include expansion of the
school day so it coincides with the work day, provision of government sub-
sidized and regulated day care centers for young children, and the offer of
incentives to employers who establish programs for their employees. A shift
in cultural norms and ideals will give unions more power to negotiate on
behalf of their members for employer-sponsored programs providing flexible
hours, day care, and parental leave. Developer-tax programs could be uti-
lized to provide incentives to employers to provide adequate childcare spac-
es for parents who wish to work rather than to stay home.
Funding for government-sponsored programs to encourage parents to
devote more time to childrearing can be provided through a re-allocation of
available resources. The majority of parents with young children in this
country currently pay for childcare. The establishment of a program similar
to the Social Security system would allow workers to contribute to the fund
slowly over the course of their working lives. The government would then
become the manager of the money, and would distribute it to parents in a
manner that will further the good of both our individual citizens and our
population as a whole. This method of funding would not require a decrease
in either our overall production level, American capability to compete in the
world market, the earning potential of any given family, or the current me-
dian standard of living. In line with the new view of childrearing as a patri-
otic service rather than an individual folly, those who do not parent children
and thus never collect from the fund will be able to view their contribution
as a substitute for performing the duty of childrearing, rather than as money
lost.
The removal of gender bias in determining whether one is going to put
priority on family or on career is crucial in the quest to eliminate gender
inequities in employment. Different people have different talents and differ-
ent interests. There is no inherent reason that a man should pursue a career
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as his first priority; none that a woman should have to place her priority on
her family; and none that a man should be the leader and a woman the
supportive assistant based solely on gender. Cultural assumptions are at the
root of government policies. As long as the norm dictates that women
should take responsibility for housekeeping and childcare, the government
will not have sufficient motivation to institute support systems to allow
women to compete fairly with men in the job market. Recognition of the
work of childrearing as valuable will pave the way for the establishment of
support systems to allow concurrent commitments to work and family. The
institutionalization of support systems which foster flexibility in working
schedules will allow families to develop a system for childcare that is appro-
priate for their individual tastes, without sacrificing any part of a given
family's earning potential. The elimination of restrictive expectations based
on gender will then complete the foundation to eradicate gender inequities
in employment.

